ÿþ <table width=100%> <tr><td> <div align="left"> <b><a href=../dc/dc280eurojournal13jul04.htm>Anglais</a></b> </div> <p> </td><td> <div align="right"> <b><a href=../indexfr.htm>Accueil</a></b> </div> <p> </td></tr> <p> <tr><td width=60% bgcolor=#EEEEFF> <div align=left> Une citation de mon livre <i>Le Secret de l'Occident</i>, par Volodymyr Poselskyy, dans un article sur les limites géographiques de l'Europe et l'agrandissement de l'Union Européenne publié le <nobr>13 juillet 2004</nobr> dans <i><a href=http://eurojournal.org>Eurojournal</a></i>, une revue moldave en ligne (<a href=#dc01>raccourci</a> vers la page 4). <br> <font size=-1> (Volodymyr Poselskyy:  The Frontiers of Europe and the Wider Europe Strategy , <i>Eurojournal</i>, www.eurojournal.org, 13juil2004, Moldavie). </font> <br> Copie de sûreté <nobr>sept 2006</nobr>. <nobr><b><a href=http://eurojournal.org/files/poselskyy.pdf> Source (pdf)</a></b></nobr>. <br> <br> </div> </td><td valign=top nowrap> <div align="right"> <b><a href=dc100fr.htm>Théorie du miracle européen</a></b> <br> <b><a href=../dc/dc001.htm>Cosandey</a></b> </div> </td></tr> </table> <p> <hr> <a name=start></a> <hr> <p> <base href="http://eurojournal.org/files/poselskyy.pdf"> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="Array; charset=Array"> <br> <br> <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> <HTML> <HEAD> <TITLE>1 The Frontiers of Europe and the Wider Europe Strategy Volodymyr POSELSKYY</TITLE> <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8"> </HEAD> <BODY vlink="blue" link="blue"> <!-- Page 1 --> <a name="1"></a> <DIV style="position:relative;width:918;height:1188;"> <STYLE type="text/css"> <!-- .ft0{font-size:13px;font-family:Times;color:#000000;} .ft1{font-size:14px;font-family:Times;color:#000000;} .ft2{font-size:16px;font-family:Times;color:#000000;} .ft3{font-size:16px;font-family:Times;color:#000000;} .ft4{font-size:16px;font-family:Times;color:#000000;} .ft5{font-size:9px;font-family:Times;color:#000000;} .ft6{font-size:16px;line-height:20px;font-family:Times;color:#000000;} .ft7{font-size:16px;line-height:20px;font-family:Times;color:#000000;} --> </STYLE> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:106"> <nobr> <span class="ft0"> <i><font style="color:black;">Volodymyr</font> <font style="color:black;">Poselskyy</i></font> </span></nobr> </DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:641"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Eurojournal.org, July 2004</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:71;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft1"><i>_____________________________________________________________________________________</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1114;left:803"><nobr><span class="ft2">1</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:107;left:243"><nobr><span class="ft3"><b>The Frontiers of Europe and the Wider Europe Strategy</b></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:148;left:370"> <nobr><span class="ft4"> <i>Volodymyr POSELSKYY</i> </span></nobr> </DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:169;left:298"><nobr><span class="ft2">Ph. D. candidate at CERI, Sciences Po, Paris </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:189;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft2">______________________________________________________________________________</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:231;left:403"><nobr><span class="ft6"><i> The delimitation of Europe requires studying <br>geography, taking into account history and adopting a <br>political decision </i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:313;left:403"><nobr><span class="ft7">Hubert Védrine, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs <br>(on the eve of the European Council Meeting in <br>Helsinki, December 1999)</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:417;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">The Berlin Wall collapse posed a complicated dilemma for the European Economic Community <br>of the time. Based on the institutionally fixed principle of the openness of the European <br>integration</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:456;left:183"><nobr><span class="ft5">1</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:458;left:189"><nobr><span class="ft2">, the EEC and, later, the European Union of 15 members were <i>a priori</i> to have rapidly </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:479;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">enlarged in the course of time admitting all new European democracies in the East of the <br>continent, which desired to join the Union and were capable of adopting the <i>acquis <br>communautaire</i>. At the same time, such an enlargement unique by its scale would have <br>influenced significantly both the European integrational project in general and the interest of <br>particular member states, due to the fact that it would introduce considerable alterations to the <br>existing balance of power within the frames of the Community, require profound institutional <br>reforming and further narrowing the right to veto granted to every state, adjusting common <br>policies and redistributing the budgets in favour of new members. In that case, the process of <br>europeanisation of the former  socialist camp would not necessarily have led to the full <br>institutional admission of the Central and East European countries (CEECs) to the EU. It would <br>probably have limited itself to a close assosiation within the frames of the established European <br>Economic Area. Staging such a scenario would have allowed the EU countries to enjoy the <br>advantages provided by the trade liberalization and the investment possibilities in the CEECs <br>avoiding painful institutional and budget adjustments which could have resulted from the <br>enlargement itself. In other words, the European Union could have felt satisfied with the <br>democratic and economic stabilization of its Eastern periphery through expanding a considerable <br>part of <i>acquis communautaire</i> on it without jeopardizing either the efficacy and internal integrity <br>of the European integration process or evident budget and political benefits for particular member <br>states.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:893;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">A bit later it became obvious that the European community had chosen the way of integral <br>settling the issues of enlargement, which presupposed, on the one hand, some preliminary <br>internal adaptation and accommodation of its present member-states interests, and on the other <br>hand, a step-by-step admission of the CEECs required by sticking to the determined criteria and <br>longlasting transition periods.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1017;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">At present the first stage of  the third unification of the continent (Pomian, 1990) is heading to <br>its logical completion. May 1 2004 will be the date when the EU-15 will welcome 8 post-<br>communist states of Central Europe and the Baltic region the reformatory governments of which </span></nobr></DIV> </DIV> <!-- Page 2 --> <a name="2"></a> <DIV style="position:relative;width:918;height:1188;"> <STYLE type="text/css"> <!-- --> </STYLE> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft0"> <i>Volodymyr Poselskyy</i> </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:641"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Eurojournal.org, July 2004</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:71;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft1"><i>_____________________________________________________________________________________</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1114;left:803"><nobr><span class="ft2">2</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:106;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">have been following the course of consistent political and economic reforms and accession to the <br>Eropean Union since the initial point (with some cution concerning Slovakia, Lithuania and <br>Latvia). The enlarged Union of 25 members (including Cyprus and Malta) is planning to adopt <br>the first Constitutional Treaty which will crown the formation period for the European Union as a <br>qualitatively new institutional and political model of the integration process. It is obvious that the <br>EU prospective enlargement to the East has become not only the incentive for internal <br>resructuring in the CEECs, but also the efficient tool for restructuring the European Community <br>itself. </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:293;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">The consistent geopolitical transformation of the Old continent is not reduced to the EU s <br>absorbing its closest Eastern and North Eastern periphery. The outsiders of the present <br>enlargement process Bolgaria and Romania are to join the EU in 2007. The rest of the Balkan <br>countries will be granted the possibility to join the European Union within the Stabilization and <br>Association process initiated in 1999. Croatia being the most successful of them can become the <br>EU member-state until 2010. If not take into consideration the vague future prospects of Turkey, <br>the final EU territorial configuration will depend on the probable membership of seven European <br>CIS states (Moldavia, Ukraine, Belarus, the Russian Federation, Georgia, Arminia and <br>Azerbaijan), which meet the basic geographical criterion. </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:500;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Where is the final point of the European Union s enlargement to the East? Is it possible to <br>determine this boundary? Wishing to find the answers to these questions in 1992 the European <br>Commission came to the conclusion that the  term  European embraced geohistorical and <br>cultural components which both facilitate the determination of the European identity. Common <br>experience of bordering on each other, sharing ideas, values and historically based cooperation is <br>not reduced to a simple formulation, thus, it can be re-evaluated by other generations... This is the <br>reason why it is neither possible nor advisable to determine the boundaries of the European <br>Union which will find themselves in the course of time </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:642;left:527"><nobr><span class="ft5">2</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:645;left:534"><nobr><span class="ft2">. Showing no desire to take the final </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:665;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">decision the European Commission put forward the Wider Europe strategy in March 2003. This <br>policy covers new Eastern neighbour states of the enlarged Union (Belarus, Moldavia and <br>Ukraine), the Russian Federation as well as the South Mediterranian countries. Brussels finds it <br>workable to turn the existing  instability curve on the EU Southern and Eastern borders into a <br> ring of friends through gradual applying the tools of close association with every neighbour <br>state in accordance with its meeting the determined criteria of rapprochement. Thus, the <br>delimitation between the Wider Union and Wider Europe will coincide with the borderline of the <br>transient Commonwealth of Independent States turning Ukraine, Moldavia and Belarus into <br>common  close neighbourhood of Russia and the European Union. </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:872;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">The author of this article suggests viewing the nowadays advancement of the European West to <br>the East of the continent through the prism of the gradual shift of its civilizational (geohistorical), <br>geopolitical, geoeconomic, institutional and political frontiers. We believe that the process of <br> coming back to Europe for the former hostages of the  socialist camp includes four <br>fundamental components: basic stabilization and europeanisation, economic association and, <br>eventually, institutional accession to the EU. The European Union enlargement itself goes <br>through a number of particular stages conditioned by the procedural rules in force, the degree of <br>readiness of the applicant states along with the requirements for the  deepening of the <br>integration process and the accommodation of interests of the Member States. </span></nobr></DIV> </DIV> <!-- Page 3 --> <a name="3"></a> <DIV style="position:relative;width:918;height:1188;"> <STYLE type="text/css"> <!-- .ft8{font-size:16px;font-family:Times;color:#000000;} .ft9{font-size:16px;font-family:Times;color:#000000;} --> </STYLE> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft0"> <i>Volodymyr Poselskyy</i></font></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:641"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Eurojournal.org, July 2004</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:71;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft1"><i>_____________________________________________________________________________________</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1114;left:803"><nobr><span class="ft2">3</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:106;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">This paper is structured as follows. The first section reminds the geohistorical divisions of <br>Europe. The second one analyzes the bases and stages of the current unification of the Continent. <br>The third examines the ongoing sucessful integration of Central European countries to the <br>European Community and the following surge of the EU enlargment to the Balkans (creation of <br>One Europe). The fourth examines a new proximity policy of the EU towards its neighbours <br>(creation of the Wider Europe). Finally, we will make an attempt to model the progressive <br>integration into the EU of Ukraine as the biggest and the most important element of the zone of <br>geopolitical uncertainty which still exists between the EU and Russia.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:293;left:149"><nobr><span class="ft8"><i><b>Geohistorical divisions of the Old Continent</b></i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:334;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Our history is the most substantial element of self-determination within the system of national, <br>religious and civilizational coordinates. The thesis on historical affiliation with Europe has <br>become an inalienable feature of the EU orientation of the East European postcommunist leaders <br>(from Croatia to Ukraine)</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:393;left:296"><nobr><span class="ft5">3</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:396;left:302"><nobr><span class="ft2">. At the same time, a number of West European politicians repudiated </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:417;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">the requests of Turkey or East European CIS states to join the EU, the repudiation being based, <br>along with other factors, on the conviction that these countries do not historically belong to the <br>European civilization as they are parts of Islamic world (Turkey) or the Russian area (Ukraine, <br>Moldavia and Transcaucasian countries)</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:476;left:394"><nobr><span class="ft5">4</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:479;left:400"><nobr><span class="ft2">.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:520;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft2">From the point of view of geohistorical development</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:518;left:505"><nobr><span class="ft5">5</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:520;left:511"><nobr><span class="ft2"> Europe is usually specified as a certain </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:541;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">civilizational unity and is often identified with West European or simply Western (Euroatlantic) <br>civilization. Civilizational boundaries of Europe are determined differently depending on the <br>criteria, epoch or the national identity of the author. Numerous West European investigators of <br>the  cold war period considered fixed borders of the Western bloc as a historically grounded <br>boundary for the European civilization. That was the boundary shaping the Carolingian Empire in <br>the East in 800 A.D. and, later, limiting the area of integral formation of liberal ideology, national <br>states, democracies and capitalism (Delmas, 1980, endras, 1997). Meanwhile, Central </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:686;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">European scholars emphasised indissoluble cultural and spiritual unity <i>Mitteleuropa</i> (as the <br>bearer of Catholicism and the former constituent, element of the Austria Hungarian Empire) with <br>the European West (Kundera, 1983). Such an emphasis on cultural and religious commonness <br>makes the ecclesiastical schism of 1054 shape the Eastern border of European civilization. That <br>schism separated Catholic Europe from orthodox Bizantium and Kyiv Rus and then turned into <br>the front line with the Golden Horde and the Ottoman Empire. According to another prevailing <br>point of view the Eastern boundary of Europe goes along the Western border of the Russain <br>geopolitical area which is considered a separate civilization (Halecki, 1952, Douguine, 2002). </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:872;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">On the whole there is a need to specify two probable approaches to the geohistorical <br>configuration of the European continent. One group of researches draws Europe as a single <br>European civilization which consists of the West European core and several layers of belonging <br>to Europe as far as the East. In particular, French geographer Jacques Lévy distinguishes three <br>gradual expansions of the European West to its Eastern periphery (Lévy, 1997). The first <br>absorbed the Central European territories which were not destroyed by the Mongols and were <br>under the rule of the Ottoman or Russian Empires for only a short time. The second expansion <br>covered the Balkans and the East of the continent which had long been under the rule of Turkey <br>or Russia. In its third expansion the European dominant extends to the centres of the Ottoman and <br>Russian Empires and the territories which had long been under the Mongols rule, with the </span></nobr></DIV> </DIV> <!-- Page 4 --> <a name="4"></a> <DIV style="position:relative;width:918;height:1188;"> <STYLE type="text/css"> <!-- --> </STYLE> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Volodymyr Poselskyy</i></font></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:641"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Eurojournal.org, July 2004</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:71;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft1"><i>_____________________________________________________________________________________</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1114;left:803"><nobr><span class="ft2">4</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:106;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">boudary between the first and the second zones overlapping the schism between the Cathilics and <br>Orthodox believers. </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:169;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">At the same time other researches separate several civilizations. In his fundumental volume <br> Grammaire de civilisations Fernand Braudel distinguishes three such civilizations:  Europe <br>(Western and Central Europe);  America (Latin America, the United States, Canada, Australia, <br>New Zeland) B0  the Other Europe (the Russian Empire  the USSR) (Braudel, 1963). </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:251;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">According to Hungarian historian Jeno Szücs the European goehistorical space is composed of <br> three Europes  Western, Cenral-Eastern and Eastern (the Russian space) (Szücs, 1985). Greek <br>researcher Dimitri Kitsikis suggests splitting the whole Euroasian continent onto three great <br>civilizational zones: 1) the West or Western Europe embracing some territories in the East, which <br>belonged to the Austrian-Hungarian and German Empires; 2) the East covering India, South-<br>Eastern Asia and China; 3) the intermediate region including the territories, which used to be <br>parts of the Byzantium and Ottoman Empires as well as the territories under Russian rule <br>(Kitsikis, 1985). </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:438;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">If, advocating F. Braudel s ideas, we determine a civilization as a geohistorical space, which is <br>characterized by the whole range of sustainable social, political and economic features together <br>with a certain collective mentality</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:476;left:355"><nobr><span class="ft5">6</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:479;left:361"><nobr><span class="ft2">, then it seems the most appropriate to separate geohistorical </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:500;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Europe into four civilizational zones: two  integral civilizations, which can be arbitrary called <br>the European West and the Euroasian East, a  split civilization of the Southern East or the <br> Orient of Europe (Prévélakis <i>in</i> Barnavi, Goossens, 2001) and, finally, the particular <br>civilizational area of Central Europe. </span></nobr></DIV> <a name="dc01"></a> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:603;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Indeed, geohistorical Europe emerged on the grounds of three great territorial formations. First of <br>all,  Europa Occidens (Carolingian and Roman Western Europe) protected from nomads forays <br>since the Xth century, did  discover Europe with its humanistic and rational attitude towards the <br>world. The variety of centres of power and initiative (external balance of European powers, <br>separation of clerical and secular authorities, autonomous rule in cities and gradual formation of <br>civil society) launched a historical and cultural  whirlwind of the West European civilization <br>(Morin, 1987). Avoiding a deep analysis of distinctive features of the European West (which was <br>the subject of research for several generations of the Europeans) it is worth paying attention to <br>the internal structure of this civilizational space, namely: the existence of a dynamic West <br>European core, which enjoyed the advantages of the four stage formula (consolidation of national <br>states, liberal ideology, capitalism and democracy) and favourable geographical position <br> (<font style="color:black;background-color:A0ffff">Cosandey</font>, 1997); its Northern (Denmark, Scandinavian countries, Iceland) and Southern (Spain, <br>Portugal, Southern Italy) peripheries. While Northern periphery countries (Great Britain included <br>in this respect) differed from the West European core states only in less distinctive European self-<br>identification, Southern periphery countries demonstrated more and more noticeable lagging <br>behind in their social, economic, political and ideological modernization. Considering all this, <br>The South of Europe is approximating the Central European region geohistorical development. </span></nobr></DIV> <a name="dc00"></a> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:976;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Civilizational closeness of the Central European countries to the West European geohistorical <br>space results from numerous factors: their involvement into cultural and spiritual achievements of <br>the European West (spreading of Catholicism, considerable impact of Renaissance, Reformation <br>and Enlightenment epochs); the initial similarity of political, social and economic structures (the <br>formation of sovereign states, the existence of feudal vassality institutions, the Magdeburg Law, </span></nobr></DIV> </DIV> <!-- Page 5 --> <a name="5"></a> <DIV style="position:relative;width:918;height:1188;"> <STYLE type="text/css"> <!-- .ft10{font-size:16px;line-height:22px;font-family:Times;color:#000000;} .ft11{font-size:16px;line-height:20px;font-family:Times;color:#000000;} --> </STYLE> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Volodymyr Poselskyy</i></font></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:641"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Eurojournal.org, July 2004</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:71;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft1"><i>_____________________________________________________________________________________</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1114;left:803"><nobr><span class="ft2">5</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:106;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">the culture of legal and contract relations); the long-lasting subordination in Austria Hungarian <br>and German Empires. However, starting with the %VI century, the Central European region </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:148;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft10">selected a civilizational pattern different from the Western Europe. The pattern revealed itself in <br>prolonged loss of statehood (under the combined pressure of Austria and Hungarian, German, <br>Ottoman and Russian Empires), in significant delay in carrying out agrarian and industrial <br>revolutions (due to introducing a second serfdom in %VI century, in particular), in confined </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:231;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">democratic reforms (excluding Czechia in respect of the last two factors). According to French <br>researcher Jacques Rupnik, Central Europe belonged to the European West referring to culture <br>and civilizational self-identification, from the point of view of its social and economic <br>development the region shared most of the features of the retrograde and state-controlled model <br>of the Euroasian East. In political dimension the Central European  semiauthoritaritarism took <br>an intermediate position between Russian despotism and Western democracy (Rupnik, 1993).</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:376;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Another great geohistoric space covered the Balkan penincular and Anatolia, which joined <br>Byzantium and Ottoman Empires in succession</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:393;left:472"><nobr><span class="ft5">7</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:396;left:478"><nobr><span class="ft2">. In this respect it is more appropriate to </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:417;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">determine a  split and mixed civilization of the  Orient of Europe as a specific civilizational <br>crossroads for the West and East, founded on the cooperation and competition of Greek, Turkish, <br>South Slavonic, Russian and Austrian elements, the fight between Orthodox believers, <br>Catholicism and Islam. The Balkan region (excluding Greece) was characterised by a more <br>significant, in comparison with Central Europe, lagging behind in national, state, democratic, <br>social and economic development intensified by the complicated ethnic interfusion of the <br>population and the established periphery position. World Wars I and II resulted in the split of the <br> Orient of Europe into three separate parts: secular Turkish Republic (an important element of <br>the post-war Western bloc); Greece, which joined the EEC in 1981; the West Balkan countries, <br>which experienced various patterns of post-war socialist construction. </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:645;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">In the long run, the Mongol invasion in the middle of the % century interrupted the <br>development of the original form of the European identity in the North-Eastern part of the <br>Christendom, i.e. in Kyiv Rus. Instead of shaping a civilization of the European East, the region <br>produced a new attempt  the Moscow Princedom, which framed a particular civilizational space <br>that could be called a Euroasian East. As was the case with the area under Ottoman rule, the <br>Russain Empire spread beyond the geographical borders of Europe reaching the Pacific Ocean <br>front in the East and the Pamirs mountains in the South. On the whole the European civilization <br>acquired the shape of a pure centralised imperial space consisting of the nucleus and four <br>periphery zones: the neighbouring Western periphery (the Baltic countries, Eastern and Central <br>Ukraine and Belarus) with the extention to Finland and Central Europe (the distant Western <br>periphery); the Southern periphery (the Transcaucasia, Central Asia); the North-Eastern periphery <br>(Siberia, the Far East). Due to its internal civilizational evolution first autocratic and later Soviet <br>Russia counterbalanced the European West relying on the tight authoritative model of <br>development and the subordination of all spheres of social life to the state rule</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:911;left:663"><nobr><span class="ft5">8</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:914;left:669"><nobr><span class="ft2">. </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:955;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">The proposed concept of  four Europes shifts the point from seeking the answer to the <br> insoluble </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:973;left:185"><nobr><span class="ft5">9</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:976;left:191"><nobr><span class="ft2"> question  Where does Europe end? to considering protracted internal schisms of </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:996;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">the European geohistorical space. The concept also explains the existence of stable periphery <br>zones in the middle of the continent. The matter is that the delimitation lines between the <br>abovementioned civilizational areas did not reduce to borderlines or boundaries but were not <br>fixed and in the course of time turned into borderlands or frontiers. Jacques Lévy remarks in this </span></nobr></DIV> </DIV> <!-- Page 6 --> <a name="6"></a> <DIV style="position:relative;width:918;height:1188;"> <STYLE type="text/css"> <!-- --> </STYLE> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Volodymyr Poselskyy</i></font></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:641"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Eurojournal.org, July 2004</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:71;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft1"><i>_____________________________________________________________________________________</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1114;left:803"><nobr><span class="ft2">6</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:106;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">respect that the European space includes some  weak points which seem to be doomed to a <br>position of a minority or a victim as well as the respective societies seem unfit for the role of <br>masters of their own fate (Lévy, 1997). Given three basic characteristics of the boundary-<br>territories (lack of statehood tradition, the status of the  buffer between various goehistorical <br>spaces and, in consequence, indetermined or inconsistent civilizational self-identification of <br>populations) one can identify two  model internal peripheries of geohistorical Europe, namely: <br>contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina in the South and Ukraine together with Belarus in the <br>East</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:249;left:138"><nobr><span class="ft5">10 15</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:251;left:168"><nobr><span class="ft2">. From the Roman Empire s split into Western and Eastern parts till collapses of Austria </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:272;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft10">and Hungary and Ottoman Empires Bosnia was deemed backward and weak periphery which <br>manifested itself in religious schism deviding the population into Orthodox believers, Catholics <br>and Muslims as well as in hopeless incapability to build up its own state structure. In its own turn <br>the historical evolution of the South-Western part of the Kyiv state following the Mongol <br>invasion brought about the separation of three different geohistorical regions: Western Ukraine as <br>the steady Eastern periphery of Central Europe (above all Greek-Catholic Halychyna, which fell <br>under Russian rule only in 1939); the Central region comprising ethnic Ukrainian lands on the <br>right and left banks of the Dnipro River and subsequently belonging to Rzech Pospolita and <br>Russia; Southern and Eastern Ukraine (steady South-Western periphery of the Euroasian space) <br>which have become ethnically mingled since settling in %VII  XVIII centuries and then </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:479;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft2">russianized with time. </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:520;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Seeing the dimensions and the further geopolitical uncertainty of the young Ukrainian state, the <br>Ukrainian issue requires particular attention. At the moment Ukrainian political stage is occupied <br>by the advocates of profound democratic reforms and Ukraine s consistent advance towards <br>united Europe ( Our Ukraine/ Nasha Ukraina , Julia Tymoshenko s Bloc and the Socialist party) <br>as well as representatives of the present authoritative oligarchical regime and communists who <br>see the future of Ukraine in close union with Russia in either a renovated Euroasian or the former <br>Soviet form. Such a division on  pro-West and  pro-Euroasian proponents reflects the <br>customary geohistorical differentiation of Ukrainian population. Thus, the latest parliamentary <br>election in spring 2002 witnessed the large-scale victory of Viktor Yushchenko s right centrist <br>bloc  Nasha Ukraina in Halytchyna and its overall victory in all other regions of Western, <br>Central and Northern Ukraine (excluding the Poltava region, where Olexander Moroz Socialist <br>party outpaced  Nasha Ukraina ), whereas communists and  statepower party representatives <br>prevailed in the South and East of Ukraine</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:766;left:410"><nobr><span class="ft5">11 16</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:769;left:439"><nobr><span class="ft2">. </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:810;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">This brief goehistorical review alows regarding the postwar European construction as the initial <br>uniting process in the European West in consequence of the West European nucleus expansion on <br>its Northern (1973, 1995) and Southern peripheries (1986). Following the accession of Greece, <br>which, frankly speaking, was treated more like a country of the North Mediterrainian region and <br>the successor of ancient Hellas, the European West entered the split space of the  Orient of <br>Europe (1981). Absorbing Eastern Germany (1990) and merging Austria (1995) foreboded the <br>present enlargement onto the Central European states. Given the predictable accession of <br>Romania and Bolgaria the rest of the Balkan states automatically turn into the inner South <br>Eastern periphery of the European Communty. Thus, the project of  One Europe is gradually <br>eliminating the goehistorical schisms in the minds of the Europeans, separated the European <br>West from Central Europe, Bysantium and Ottoman Southern East. At the same time European <br>modern mental geography preserves the civilizational boundary with Turkey and the </span></nobr></DIV> </DIV> <!-- Page 7 --> <a name="7"></a> <DIV style="position:relative;width:918;height:1188;"> <STYLE type="text/css"> <!-- --> </STYLE> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Volodymyr Poselskyy</i></font></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:641"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Eurojournal.org, July 2004</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:71;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft1"><i>_____________________________________________________________________________________</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1114;left:803"><nobr><span class="ft2">7</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:106;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Commonwealth of Independent States, which is considered to be the successor of the Euroasian <br>East not without good reason.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:169;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Seeing Russian positioning as an equal partner rather than a potential member of the European <br>Union as well as Russian aspiration for preserving its geopolitical and civilizational zone of <br>influence the debate on political delimitation of the One Europe is being reduced to the issue of <br>borders between the enlarged European Union and the  expanded Russian space without <br>considering the problem of Turkey. If the geopolitical route for Moldova and Belarus appear to <br>be practically determined (further EU integration for the former and close union with Russia for <br>the latter), while the future for the Transcaucasian states is beyond foreseeing, the Ukrainian <br>issue might require close attention in the coming decade. </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:397;left:147"><nobr><span class="ft8"><i><b>Stages and bases of the current unification process on the continent</b></i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:438;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Contemporary move to unite Europe within a single political and economic community is often <br>regarded as the latest geopolitical  expansion of the West or, vice versa, a civilizational <br> European homecoming . We believe that it is worthwhile defining the current advancement of <br>the European Union to the East of the continent as the process of voluntarily assuming all the <br>Western norms and values by the countries of the former Eastern Europe, which facilitates their <br>economic integration as well as further accession to the European Community. Regarding all this <br>approaching the EU contains four interconnected stages: stabilization, basic europeanisation, the <br>establishment of association and the acquiring of membership.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:624;left:133"><nobr><span class="ft4"><i>1. Stabilization</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:665;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Internal territorial integrity and friendly relations with country neighbours form the reliable basis <br>for democratic and market transformations in each post-communist state. However, the <br>stabilization is not reduced to eliminating military conflict threat or hedging particular regions <br>( hard threats). It presupposes efficient state management which provides for effective <br>combatting organized crime and corruption inside the country, reliable border controlling and <br>preventing illigal emigration of its citizens to other countries ( weak threats). Therefore, <br>reaching full stability requires the formation of not only a  strong but also a lawful and wealthy <br>state with transparent governing, respecting fundamental rights and freedoms of its citizens, <br>namely, the rights of national minorities, overcoming social and economic backwardness and <br>poverty of the population. The upsurge of national conflicts in Yugoslavia and the USSR, the <br>considerable number of national minorities in Central European countries, overall threat of <br> weak risks assigned the stabilization with the prominent role in Western Europe. In practice, <br>the EU initiated concluding the Stability Pact for Central Eastern (1995) and South Eastern <br>Europe (1999). Nowadays basic stabilization tasks are pressing for solution in the Transcaucasian <br>states (undetermined status for Abkhazia, Nagorny Karabakh and Southern Osetia), in the <br>Russian Federation (the war in Chechnya), in Serbia and Montenegro (the future for Kosovo and <br>Montenegro), in Moldova (the problem of the Transdniestr region), whereas Bosnia and <br>Hertzogovina have succeeded in stabilization under the protectorate of the international <br>community. Although almost all the countries of the Western Balkans pose considerable weak <br>threats. </span></nobr></DIV> </DIV> <!-- Page 8 --> <a name="8"></a> <DIV style="position:relative;width:918;height:1188;"> <STYLE type="text/css"> <!-- .ft12{font-size:16px;line-height:20px;font-family:Times;color:#000000;} --> </STYLE> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Volodymyr Poselskyy</i></font></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:641"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Eurojournal.org, July 2004</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:71;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft1"><i>_____________________________________________________________________________________</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1114;left:803"><nobr><span class="ft2">8</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:127;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft4"><i> 2.Basic europeanisation</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:169;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Basic europeanisation means the general process of political, economic and social transformation <br>which promoted the transition of the former socialist states to sustainable democracy, lawful state <br>and market economy</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:207;left:271"><nobr><span class="ft5">12</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:210;left:283"><nobr><span class="ft2">. In this respect basic europeanisation includes three elements: 1) </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:231;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">fundamental reform of various parts of a national legislation meeting the commitments made to <br>the European Council, the WTO and the EU (change of legal scope); 2) practical implementation <br>of new rules of play in political and business activity (change in conduct of local political and <br>economic agents); 3) European selfidentification by the elit and the majority of population, which <br>reveals itself in the orientation not only to the civilizational but also to the contemporary political <br>and economic model of European development (change of collective awareness). In other words, <br>basic europeanisation is the process of shifting geopolitical boundaries of the European political <br>area</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:373;left:136"><nobr><span class="ft5">13</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:376;left:148"><nobr><span class="ft2">. According to the report  Nations in Transit 2003 produced by American non-</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:396;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">governmental organization  Freedom House , all Central and South East European states (except <br>Bosnia and Hertzogovina) have already reached the level of consolidated or partially <br>consolidated democracy, while the CIS European countries remain transitional or autocratic <br>regimes (see Table 1)</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:456;left:263"><nobr><span class="ft5">14</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:458;left:275"><nobr><span class="ft2">. From its own part, the EU introduced regional financial aid programmes </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:479;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">(PHARE, TACIS, CARDS), which aim at promoting faster stabilization and europeanisation of <br>post-communist states. </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:541;left:337"><nobr><span class="ft4"><i>Table 1. Steps of basic europeanisation </i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:563;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft12"><b>Consolid<br>ated <br>democra-<br>cies</b></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:562;left:193"><nobr><span class="ft2">DEM RO</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:583;left:247"><nobr><span class="ft2">L</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:563;left:287"><nobr><span class="ft12"><b>Democracie<br>s </b></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:584;left:338"><nobr><span class="ft3"><b>(some </b></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:604;left:287"><nobr><span class="ft12"><b>consolida-<br>tion)</b></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:562;left:393"><nobr><span class="ft7">DE<br>M</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:562;left:435"><nobr><span class="ft7">RO<br>L</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:563;left:481"><nobr><span class="ft12"><b>Transition-<br>al (hybrid) <br>regimes</b></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:562;left:578"><nobr><span class="ft7">DE<br>M</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:562;left:620"><nobr><span class="ft7">RO<br>L</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:564;left:666"><nobr><span class="ft9">AutocraA</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:564;left:736"><nobr><span class="ft9">ie</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:584;left:666"><nobr><span class="ft3"><b>s</b></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:562;left:763"><nobr><span class="ft7">DE<br>M</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:562;left:805"><nobr><span class="ft7">RO<br>L</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:667;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft2">Poland</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:667;left:193"><nobr><span class="ft2">1,63</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:667;left:247"><nobr><span class="ft7">2,0<br>0</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:667;left:287"><nobr><span class="ft2">Bolgaria</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:667;left:393"><nobr><span class="ft2">3,13 3,88 Bosnia</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:667;left:578"><nobr><span class="ft2">4,31 5,00 Azerbaijan</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:667;left:763"><nobr><span class="ft2">5,31 5,75</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:709;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft2">Slovenia</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:709;left:193"><nobr><span class="ft2">1,75</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:709;left:247"><nobr><span class="ft7">1,8<br>8</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:709;left:287"><nobr><span class="ft2">Romania</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:709;left:393"><nobr><span class="ft2">3,25 4,38 Moldova</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:709;left:578"><nobr><span class="ft2">4,38 5,38 Belarus</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:709;left:763"><nobr><span class="ft2">6,63 6,13</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:751;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft2">Hungary</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:751;left:193"><nobr><span class="ft2">1,81</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:751;left:247"><nobr><span class="ft7">2,2<br>5</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:751;left:287"><nobr><span class="ft2">Croatia</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:751;left:393"><nobr><span class="ft2">3,44 4,50 Ukraine</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:751;left:578"><nobr><span class="ft2">4,50 5,13</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:793;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft2">Slovakia</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:793;left:193"><nobr><span class="ft2">1,81</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:793;left:247"><nobr><span class="ft7">2,6<br>3</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:793;left:287"><nobr><span class="ft2">Serbia </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:793;left:357"><nobr><span class="ft2">and </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:814;left:287"><nobr><span class="ft2">Montenegro </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:793;left:393"><nobr><span class="ft2">3,50 4,63 Armenia</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:793;left:578"><nobr><span class="ft2">4,69 5,38</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:835;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft2">Luthuania 1,88</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:835;left:247"><nobr><span class="ft7">2,6<br>3</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:835;left:287"><nobr><span class="ft2">Albania</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:835;left:393"><nobr><span class="ft2">3,94 4,63 Georgia</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:835;left:578"><nobr><span class="ft2">4,69 5,13</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:877;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft2">Estonia </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:877;left:193"><nobr><span class="ft2">1.94</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:877;left:247"><nobr><span class="ft7">2,1<br>3</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:877;left:287"><nobr><span class="ft2">Macedonia</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:877;left:393"><nobr><span class="ft2">3,94 5,00 Russia</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:877;left:578"><nobr><span class="ft2">4,88 5,13</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:920;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft2">Latvia</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:920;left:193"><nobr><span class="ft2">1,94</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:920;left:247"><nobr><span class="ft7">2,8<br>8</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:962;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Czech <br>republic</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:962;left:193"><nobr><span class="ft2">2,00</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:962;left:247"><nobr><span class="ft7">3,0<br>0</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1025;left:147"><nobr><span class="ft4"><i>3. Establishment of association</i></span></nobr></DIV> </DIV> <!-- Page 9 --> <a name="9"></a> <DIV style="position:relative;width:918;height:1188;"> <STYLE type="text/css"> <!-- --> </STYLE> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Volodymyr Poselskyy</i></font></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:641"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Eurojournal.org, July 2004</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:71;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft1"><i>_____________________________________________________________________________________</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1114;left:803"><nobr><span class="ft2">9</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:106;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">The institution of association based on article 310 of the Treaty establishing the European <br>Community (TEC) is often identified with the EU associate membership status. Actually it <br>embraces various forms of associated partnership which are carried out through specially <br>established bodies (Councils, committees associations/partnerships) and mainly deal with <br>promoting various forms of economic integration: joining the Single Market, setting up the <br>Customs Union or a free trade zone with the EU (see Table 2). Given all this, Partnership and <br>Cooperation agreements (PCA) with the CIS states should be considered the lowest level of <br>association, which points out only the possibility to set up a free trade zone with the Russian <br>Federation, Moldova and Ukraine in future (depending on the realization of economic reforms in <br>these countries). On the whole the Association agreements concluded by the EU can be fairly <br>related to the shift of its geoeconomic borders. </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:355;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Close connection of associated partnership with the EU accession procedure seems none the less <br>misleading. It is out of doubt that joining the EU goes through preliminary economic <br>liberalization, which, in its turn, requires an EU country-partner to assimilate numerous elements <br>of <i>acquis communautaire</i>, whose task is to provide equal and fair competition (harmonization of <br>antitrust legislation, corporate law, state subsidy regimes, rules for protecting copyright and <br>consumers rights, etc.). Associated partnership undoubtedly facilitates economic modernization <br>of the associated countries and their approaching the European Union. At the same time the very <br>fact of concluding Association agreements has limited impact on initiating the EU institutional <br>accession procedure under which it is much more important for the EU to formally admit the <br> applicant status of a country as well as for the country to apply</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:538;left:574"><nobr><span class="ft5">15</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:541;left:586"><nobr><span class="ft2">. In other words, the realization </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:562;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">of associated partnership differs from the accession procedure, though they are interconnected <br>processes which can take place simultaneously much the way it happened with the Baltik states <br>or Slovenia. Sometimes Association agreements serve rather as a means of putting off the <br>probable membership (first  European agreements with Poland and Hungary, establishing the <br>Customs Union with Turkey), as an alternative to the membership itself (the EEA agreement, <br>probable Neighbourhood agreements with the CIS states), or even as a form of privileged <br>relations with the former colonies of the Southern Mediterrainian, Tropical Africa or Latin <br>America regions. On the whole, as is the case with geopolitical Europe, the Eastern geoeconomic <br>boundary of the European Community coincides with the Western border of the CIS. </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:769;left:242"><nobr><span class="ft4"><i>Table 2. Steps of economic integration of the European periphery</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:790;left:128"><nobr><span class="ft2">Level of </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:811;left:123"><nobr><span class="ft2">economic </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:832;left:119"><nobr><span class="ft2">integration</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:790;left:240"><nobr><span class="ft2">State-</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:811;left:220"><nobr><span class="ft2">participants</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:832;left:233"><nobr><span class="ft2">(beyond</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:852;left:221"><nobr><span class="ft2">The EU-25 </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:873;left:258"><nobr><span class="ft2">)</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:790;left:322"><nobr><span class="ft2">Date of </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:811;left:324"><nobr><span class="ft2">signing </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:832;left:338"><nobr><span class="ft2">the </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:852;left:318"><nobr><span class="ft2">ssociatio</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:873;left:345"><nobr><span class="ft2">n </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:894;left:315"><nobr><span class="ft2">agreemen</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:915;left:346"><nobr><span class="ft2">t </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:790;left:401"><nobr><span class="ft2">Date of </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:811;left:393"><nobr><span class="ft2">applicatio</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:832;left:423"><nobr><span class="ft2">n</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:790;left:506"><nobr><span class="ft2">Characteristic features and commentaries</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:936;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7"><b>New <br>member-<br>states<br></b>(since <br>1.05.2004)</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:936;left:220"><nobr><span class="ft7">Malta<br>Cyprus</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:998;left:220"><nobr><span class="ft7">Poland<br>Hungary<br>Czech rep.<br>Slovakia</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:936;left:314"><nobr><span class="ft7">05.12.19<br>70<br>19.12.19<br>72</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1039;left:314"><nobr><span class="ft7">16.12.19<br>91</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:936;left:395"><nobr><span class="ft7">16.07.19<br>90<br>03.07.19<br>90</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1039;left:395"><nobr><span class="ft7">05.04.19<br>94</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:936;left:476"><nobr><span class="ft3"><b>Cyprus, </b></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:936;left:564"><nobr><span class="ft3"><b>Malta</b>: </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:936;left:642"><nobr><span class="ft2">concluding </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:936;left:746"><nobr><span class="ft2">Association </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:957;left:476"><nobr><span class="ft7">agreements, which envisage a probable two-<br>stage establishment of the Customs Union (in <br>both cases pending the negotiations on <br>accession, with the Customs Union on <br>manufactured goods being not realized)<br><b>CCEE</b>: concluding  European agreements , </span></nobr></DIV> </DIV> <!-- Page 10 --> <a name="10"></a> <DIV style="position:relative;width:918;height:1188;"> <STYLE type="text/css"> <!-- --> </STYLE> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Volodymyr Poselskyy</i></font></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:641"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Eurojournal.org, July 2004</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:71;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft1"><i>_____________________________________________________________________________________</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1114;left:794"><nobr><span class="ft2">10</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:107;left:220"><nobr><span class="ft7">Estonia<br>Lithuania<br>Latvia<br>Slovenia</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:107;left:314"><nobr><span class="ft7">16.12.19<br>91<br>06.10.19<br>93<br>06.10.19<br>93<br>12.06.19<br>95<br>12.06.19<br>95<br>12.06.19<br>95<br>10.06.19<br>96</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:107;left:395"><nobr><span class="ft7">31.03.19<br>94<br>17.01.19<br>96<br>27.06.19<br>95<br>24.11.19<br>95<br>08.12.19<br>95<br>03.10.19<br>9510.06.<br>1996</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:107;left:476"><nobr><span class="ft7">which stipulate an asymmetrical transition to <br>free manufactured goods trade zones, partial <br>liberalization of three other freedoms<br>Other spheres: political dialogue, introduction of <br>a visa-free regime</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:398;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft12"><b>European <br>Economic <br>Area</b></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:398;left:220"><nobr><span class="ft7">Norway<br>Iceland<br>Liechtenste<br>in</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:418;left:318"><nobr><span class="ft2">02.05.19</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:439;left:340"><nobr><span class="ft2">92</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:398;left:476"><nobr><span class="ft7">Access to the EU common market through free <br>movement of manufactured goods, people, <br>services and capitals (without expansion to <br>agriculture and Customs regime of the third <br>world countries).<br>Other spheres: joining the EU foreign policy <br>declarations, Norway and Iceland s joining the <br>Shengen area</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:564;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft12"><b>Customs <br>Union</b></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:564;left:220"><nobr><span class="ft2">Turkey</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:564;left:314"><nobr><span class="ft7">12.09.19<br>63</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:564;left:395"><nobr><span class="ft7">14.04.19<br>87</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:564;left:476"><nobr><span class="ft7">Customs Union introduction since 1.01.1996 <br>regarding manufactured goods<br>Other spheres: political dialogue, maintaining <br>the visa regime</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:648;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft12"><b>Free trade <br>zone</b></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:647;left:220"><nobr><span class="ft7">Switzerlan<br>d</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:730;left:220"><nobr><span class="ft7">Romania<br>Bolgaria</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:647;left:318"><nobr><span class="ft2">22.07.19</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:668;left:340"><nobr><span class="ft2">72</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:730;left:318"><nobr><span class="ft2">08.02.19</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:751;left:340"><nobr><span class="ft2">93</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:772;left:318"><nobr><span class="ft2">01.03.19</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:793;left:340"><nobr><span class="ft2">93</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:710;left:399"><nobr><span class="ft2">22.06.19</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:730;left:421"><nobr><span class="ft2">95</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:751;left:399"><nobr><span class="ft2">14.12.19</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:772;left:421"><nobr><span class="ft2">95</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:647;left:476"><nobr><span class="ft7">Switzerland: the 1972 fundamental agreement <br>on free exchange of goods was supplemented by <br>a number of other sector agreements, in <br>particular, by the 1999 agreement on free <br>movement of people<br>Romania, </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:751;left:570"><nobr><span class="ft2">Bolgaria: </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:751;left:662"><nobr><span class="ft2">European </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:751;left:756"><nobr><span class="ft2">associated </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:772;left:476"><nobr><span class="ft7">partnership like for other CCEE, delayed <br>transition to a visa-free regime</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:814;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft12"><b>Free trade <br>zone in the <br>making</b></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:814;left:220"><nobr><span class="ft7">Croatia<br>Macedonia<br>Albania<br>Serbia <br>Montenegr<br>o<br>Bosnia <br>Hertzegovi<br>na</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:814;left:318"><nobr><span class="ft2">29.10.20</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:835;left:340"><nobr><span class="ft2">01</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:855;left:318"><nobr><span class="ft2">09.04.20</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:876;left:340"><nobr><span class="ft2">01</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:897;left:315"><nobr><span class="ft7">(negotiati<br>ons being </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:938;left:316"><nobr><span class="ft2">conducte</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:959;left:342"><nobr><span class="ft2">d)</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:814;left:395"><nobr><span class="ft7">21.02.20<br>03</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:814;left:476"><nobr><span class="ft7">Progressive conclusion of Stabilization and <br>Association agreements, which stipulate an <br>asymmetrical transition to free trade zones; <br>The EU s implementation of substential trade <br>preferences for the countries of the region <br>starting with late 2000<br>Other spheres: arranging political dialogue, <br>maintaining the visa regime (excluding Croatia)</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1021;left:147"><nobr><span class="ft4"><i>4. Institutional accession</i></span></nobr></DIV> </DIV> <!-- Page 11 --> <a name="11"></a> <DIV style="position:relative;width:918;height:1188;"> <STYLE type="text/css"> <!-- --> </STYLE> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Volodymyr Poselskyy</i></font></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:641"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Eurojournal.org, July 2004</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:71;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft1"><i>_____________________________________________________________________________________</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1114;left:794"><nobr><span class="ft2">11</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:106;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Given the complexity and significance of the EU accession procedure, it may take from 3-4 years <br>(for instance, for Finland and Sweeden) up to 10 years and more (for the countries involved in the <br>current enlargement)<b>.</b> The EU Council adopts all decisions on enlargement under the unanimity <br>rule, which grants every member-state the right to veto the candidature of this or that country or, <br>at least, to efficiently block various stages of the accession procedure. In this respect one should <br>be aware of the importance of the EU Council s acknowledgement of the prospective <br>membership for an applican country, though it is not institutionally required. It emphasizes <br>common political will of the member-states to affiliate an applicant state provided it qualifies.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:293;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">As is known, the accession procedure grounds, first of all, on current article 49 of the Treaty on <br>the European Union (former article 237 of the TEC), which stipulates three basic requirements <br>established for applicant-states:</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:376;left:160"><nobr><span class="ft2">1. To be a European state geographically </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:417;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Despite lengthy debates on borders on the European continent, political geography clearly defines <br>the essense of  a European state with particular reservations as to only two Euroasian states such <br>as Turkey, 3 % of whose territory is in Europe and the rest in Asia, and the Russian Federation, <br>which can arbitrarily be divided into European and Asian parts. The South Mediterrainian states <br>are unconditionally referred to as African and Asian countries, while 15 former republics of the <br>Soviet Union split into new European (Baltic states, Transcaucasian states, Ukraine, Moldova, <br>Belarus) and Asian (Central Asian states) states</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:538;left:467"><nobr><span class="ft5">16</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:541;left:480"><nobr><span class="ft2">. Following the inconsistency with the basic </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:562;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">geographic criterion, the EEC Council of Ministers rejected Marocco s application (1987). In its <br>Communication  Wider Europe  Neighbourhood the European Commission confirmed the <br>impossibility of accession to the EU for all its  non-European Mediterranean partners along with <br>the probable accession prospects for such  European states on the East of Europe that  have <br>clearly expressed their wish to join the Union . <br> </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:727;left:160"><nobr><span class="ft2">2. To strive for the EU membership</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:769;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">The obvious character of the statement covers the fundamental principle of voluntary and <br>democratic structure of the European Community, which neither poses any threats to its <br>neighbours nor plots any territorial expansion. The European Union respects the sovereign right <br>of such states as Iceland, Switzerland or Russia to remain aloof from the European integration <br>process. Thus, the EU membership prerequisite is a clearly shaped national strategy of integration <br>to the EU as well as an institutionally required application of a European state. </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:914;left:160"><nobr><span class="ft2">3. To be a sustainable democracy </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:955;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">General Franco s authoritative regime was the first to make certain that the European Community <br>is not only a project of economic integration but also a union of democratic nations when it <br>applied for association with the EEC in 1962. Lengthy negotiations resulted only in Spain s <br>signing a trade preferential agreement in 1970. Its further approaching the Community was <br>distinctly conditioned by its transition to democracy. At the same time, the establishment of <br>military dictatorship in Greece in 1967 made the European Commission suspend the Association </span></nobr></DIV> </DIV> <!-- Page 12 --> <a name="12"></a> <DIV style="position:relative;width:918;height:1188;"> <STYLE type="text/css"> <!-- --> </STYLE> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Volodymyr Poselskyy</i></font></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:641"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Eurojournal.org, July 2004</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:71;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft1"><i>_____________________________________________________________________________________</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1114;left:794"><nobr><span class="ft2">12</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:106;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Agreement with this country. However, democratic reforms in Greece, Portugal and Spain in <br>1974-1975 assisted their furhter integration to the EEC. In the context of the EU enlargment on <br>Central and East European states the 1993 Copenhagen Council confirmed the existence of stable <br>democratic institutions as the basic accession criterion. The 1996-1997 Amsterdam <br>Intergovernmental Conference amended article 49 of the Treaty on the EU that now envisages <br>that  any European state, which respects the principles set out in Article 6 (1) (principles of <br>liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law), <br>may apply to become a member of the Union . Within the frameworks of meeting the political <br>criteria, the EU obliged the applicant states from the East of Europe to guarantee the rights of <br>their national minorities and maintain neighbourly relations in the region. </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:334;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">The Copenhagen European Council of June 1993 consolidated two more important accession <br>criteria: efficient market economy ready to compete at the EU domestic market; the ability to <br>acquire <i>acquis communautaire</i> in corpore.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:417;left:160"><nobr><span class="ft2">4. To be an efficient market economy</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:458;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Conformity with the basic priciples of market economy automatically arose from the necessity of <br>profound convergence of the member states economies within the  Common market . <br>Meanwhile, as was proved by the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal, given the current <br>enlargement of the EU on Central European countries and preplanned absorbing the Balkan states <br>even considerable recess in social and economic development cannot obstruct the EU <br>membership, it can only postpone it. In other words, the efficiency of national market <br>mechanisms rather than current economic wealth is taken into account while considering the <br>economic state of an applicant-country (a healthy rather than wealthy criteria). The pre-accession <br>level of economic integration to the European Union is not specified either, which, at least <br>theoretically, obviates the necessity to conclude a preliminary Association agreement with the EU <br>for a potential applicant-state.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:707;left:160"><nobr><span class="ft7"> <br>5. To be concordant with and able to adopt <i>acquis communautaire</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:769;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">The Community put forward the requirement of introducing aggregate <i>acquis communaitaire</i> into <br>national legislation of an applicant-country during the first enlargement on Great Britain, Ireland <br>and Denmark (1973). It would not be an exageration to view the general accession procedure as <br>the process of adopting the <i>acquis communaitaire</i> by an applican-state that sets the subject for <br>accession negotiations and that all is fixed in an Accession treaty in detail. The approaching of <br>legislation of post-communist countries to the EU legislation actually started at the stages of <br>stabilization and basic europeanisation, continued at the stage of implementing Association <br>agreements and will continue after the official accession date till the full completion of transition <br>periods envisaged by the Accession treaty. Thus, satisfying this criterion goes far beyond initial <br> applicant attempts of a country and can be assessed by its juridical and administrative <br>capability to meet the commitmetns made. Observing this prerequisite does not cover, however, <br>an applicant-state s probable  eurosceptical view of goals and final political structure of the <br>Union, which means the consent to share the contemporary <i>acquis communautaire</i>, and not <br>necessarily still indeterminate <i>finalité politique</i>. To claim the opposite would mean to deny the <br>accession of Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries.</span></nobr></DIV> </DIV> <!-- Page 13 --> <a name="13"></a> <DIV style="position:relative;width:918;height:1188;"> <STYLE type="text/css"> <!-- --> </STYLE> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Volodymyr Poselskyy</i></font></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:641"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Eurojournal.org, July 2004</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:71;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft1"><i>_____________________________________________________________________________________</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1114;left:794"><nobr><span class="ft2">13</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:127;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Nonetheless, institutional approval of these five prerequisites together with principles of their <br>implementation (general non-discrimination and differentiation of applicant states corresponding <br>to their progress) does not eliminate certain political and juridical vagueness of the accession <br>procedure. As has been mentioned above, the founding Treaties and the EU secondary <br>legislation do not include provisions that would stipulate prerequisites for an applicant-state <br>status. The Councils of the European Union in Luxemburg (1997) and Helsinki (1999) clearly <br>stated that adherence to the political component of the Copenhagen criteria is the prerequisite for <br>initiating the negotiations on accession, while the accession itself will depend on the satisfaction <br>of economic requirements and the ability to meet the commitments ensuing the EU membership. <br>It allows us to consider any European democracy as a prospective candidate for the EU <br>membership. The EEA countries and Switzerland have been recognized as unquestionable <br>candidates to join the Community and the only obstacle on this way is the lack of political will <br>expressed by the elite or/and the population ofthese countries. At the same time the question <br>whether it is eligible to acknowledge the prospective EU membership for authoritarian or <br>transitional European regimes with the aim of supporting and facilitating their internal <br>democratic reforms. The history of European integration knows at least two cases of <br>unambiguous  premature recognition of accession prospects for Franco s Spain and Milosevic s <br>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which, undoubtedly, fostered the further democracy in those <br>countries</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:497;left:172"><nobr><span class="ft5">17</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:500;left:184"><nobr><span class="ft2">. The current EU finds it inefficient to follow the same pattern regarding transitional </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:520;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">regimes of Ukraine and Moldova despite the appeals of both the authorities and democratic <br>opposition of these countries.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:583;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">It seems reasonable, in this respect, to investigate the details of the debate on the impact, which <br>the recognition of the EU prospective membership had on fostering the internal transformations <br>of post-communist countries. In particular, Polish scholar Leszek Jesien believes that the <br>recognized accession prospect  turns European political and social standards into an effective <br>shock-absorber for the political life of a given country, which results in certain  foolish steps of <br>the ruling top having no chances for political implementation (Jesien in Kowal, 2002). German <br>scholars Iris Kempe and Wim van Meurs focus on the interaction of three factors: 1) the current <br>situation in the country that is taken into account by the European Union while working out its <br>own strategy of granting financial assistance to that country; 2) policies of the respective national <br>government that manages the current situation and somehow experiences outward impact; 3) the <br>EU interference and guidance the success of which depends first and foremost on rendering the <br>membership prospects to the country (Kempe, van Meurs, 2002).</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:852;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">In practice the formal confirmation of the membership prospects for Central European countries <br>(June, 1993) took place much later than democratic reformatory governments came to power and <br>concurred initial economic growth in Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic. Central European <br>and Baltic countries have always viewed the  back to Europe policy as a priority, optimal and <br>single strategy for national development that could logically foster and strengthen democratic and <br>economic transformations initiated in a country. Therefore, the recognition of the prospective <br>membership enabled the countries, on the one hand, to legitimize its political alternative and, on <br>the other hand, to direct and facilitate its internal europeanisation in its basic (politcal pluralism, <br>fair economic competition, unconstrained judicial power, and the independent press) and <br>profound integrational (incorporating <i>acquis communautaire</i>) dimentions. The issue of <br>prospective membership to Bolgaria and Romania and since 1999 the rest of Balkan states </span></nobr></DIV> </DIV> <!-- Page 14 --> <a name="14"></a> <DIV style="position:relative;width:918;height:1188;"> <STYLE type="text/css"> <!-- --> </STYLE> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Volodymyr Poselskyy</i></font></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:641"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Eurojournal.org, July 2004</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:71;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft1"><i>_____________________________________________________________________________________</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1114;left:794"><nobr><span class="ft2">14</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:106;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">derived from the EU political engagement rather than from actual achievements of the region in <br>the countries strive for reaching the Copenhagen criteria. In any case the acknowledgement of <br>prospective membership becomes expedient only when the elite together with the population of a <br>country accumulate a certain critical mass of reformatory tendencies which encourages coming to <br>power of democratic pro-european forces as well as sustainable and consecutive pace. For <br>instance, if the current Ukrainian authorities prove able to preserve their political and economic <br>positions, the issue of prospective membership for Ukraine will obviously have no real contents. <br>At the same time, taking into account 2004 presidential elections that are extremely important for <br>the country it would undoubtedly be appropriate for the EU to recognize the Ukrainian <br>prospective membership prematurely. This recognition, as was the case with Yugoslavia, would <br>have to embody two major aspects: confirming the European future for democratic Ukraine; <br>expressing support to Ukrainian civil society and democratic opposition in their effort to see <br>Ukrain as a European state (see footnote 17). </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:396;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">The issue of prospective membership is to be considered first and foremost a political act of the <br>European community, which demostrates its <i>a priori</i> consent to admit a new member, whereas <br>the accession procedure itself basically depends on consistency and purposefulness of internal <br>transformations. The Central European experience proves that sustainable dynamics of the <br>countries European integration movement at the decisive stage was provided at the expense of <br>efficacious interaction of three factors: 1) consistent monitoring in the form of annual reports to <br>the Commission that reflected the details of the actual progress of every candidate-state; 2) <br>instruments of  Accession Partnerships implemented by the European Union, which combined <br>in a single document the list of priority direction to realise <i>acquis communautaire</i> for the given <br>candidate country as well as the EU financial assistance aligned with it; 3) programmes for <br>adapting to <i>acquis communautaire </i>worked out by candidate countries that were based on <br> Accession Partnerships and envisaged the detailed programme for harmonizing various <br>branches of national legislation including timetables and references to administrative and <br>financial means of fulfiling the given tasks. Such a three step scheme of approaching the EU will <br>soon be fully implemented in the West Balkan countries (monitoring,  European Integration <br>Partnerships instruments and national programmes for their implementation). <br>Statutory vagueness of the EU accession procedure arises from non-compulsory character of its <br>institutional principles in general. The thing is that the effective accession criteria are only some <br>kind of operational  rules of game that do not impose certain legal obligations on member <br>states (that is to say, the decisions in this sphere are beyond the European Court jurisdiction) <br>relevant to the way of interpreting appeals for membership from other European countries. The <br>issue of the EU membership provides the European candidate states with an opportunity, but not <br>with a right to join the European Union (Torreblanca, 2003). Hence, it seems reasonable to add <br>the abovementioned five accession criteria with one more significant requirement to a candidate <br>country:</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:934;left:147"><nobr><span class="ft2">6. To have the Community s consent to accession</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:976;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">In addition to readiness criteria to be met by a candidate country it is essential to consider the <br>Union s overall capacity to enlarge as well as the positions and interests of particular member <br>states. Every enlargement of 6 basic countries core brought about some discord between the <br>Community members splitting them into  euro-optimists and  euro-sceptics , into investors and <br>users of European funds, into liberalists and governmentalists, into small and great states, into </span></nobr></DIV> </DIV> <!-- Page 15 --> <a name="15"></a> <DIV style="position:relative;width:918;height:1188;"> <STYLE type="text/css"> <!-- --> </STYLE> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Volodymyr Poselskyy</i></font></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:641"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Eurojournal.org, July 2004</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:71;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft1"><i>_____________________________________________________________________________________</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1114;left:794"><nobr><span class="ft2">15</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:106;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7"> the Mediterranean and East European lobbies , etc. However, it will be a mistake to view the <br>enlargement process as the one posing threats to the integrity and effectiveness of the European <br>integration project because starting with the initial absorption of Great Britain, Ireland and <br>Denmark and finishing with the recent accession of 10 countries the enlargement prospect has <br>always been  a necessary catalist for long-owerdue reforms </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:186;left:575"><nobr><span class="ft5">18</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:189;left:588"><nobr><span class="ft2"> within the Community. This </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:210;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">statement proved to be the most striking in the current process of the EU enlargment that <br>enhanced the relisation of the long-standing idea of establishing a political union. What could not <br>be accomplished during post-war four decades (Pleven and Fouchet plans, Tindemans report, <br>Genscher-Colombo initiative, Spinelli project), proved credible in Germany uniting and the EU <br>further expansion to the East</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:290;left:313"><nobr><span class="ft5">19</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:293;left:325"><nobr><span class="ft2">. </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:334;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Positioning the member states with regard to the enlargement process is not reduced only to the <br>preservation of <i>acquis communautaire</i> but is also illustrated by a number of other factors, <br>namely: geographical and historical proximity of a candidate country, loss of some financial <br>advantages, disturbance of the Union s internal political balance as well as traditional strategic <br>and foreign policy considerations. Germany s consistent support of issuing the EU membership <br>for Central and East European countries arises from viewing the enlargment process as a chance <br>to set up a new European federation (J. Fischer s approach), special close relations with the <br>countries of the region and substantial economic advantages. Great Britain and Denmark backed <br>up rapid expansion to Central and East European countries mainly reckoning that the achieved <br>differentiation level inside the Union could put an end to political projects of its further <br>federalisation. Meanwhile, France expressed the greatest number of apprehensions and doubts <br>related to the accession of Central and East European countries under the pressure of a range of <br>factors, namely: estimation of enlargement as potential threat to the idea of  Europe-puissance ; <br>fear of losing its considerable political position in an wider Europe; traditional care for the <br>Southern Mediterranean. From this point of view such small and relatively prosperous countries <br>as Slovenia, Hungary and Estonia (which could also expect some member states to lobby their <br>candidacy) <i>a priori</i> find it much easier to join the EU than, for instance, Turkey or Ukraine the <br>accession of which could brought about substantial redirection of European budget money.<br>It is also worth mentioning the impact the traditional regional links and geographical realia have <br>on the EU enlargement process. It would have been problematic to carry out, for instance, the <br>1997 first  Luxembourg project of enlargment to the East, which drew the demarcation line of <br>the Community separating Czech Republic from Slovakia as well as upsetting political and <br>economic integrity of the Baltic countries. Issuing membership to Romania brings Moldova <br>closer to the European Union and probable accession of Turkey will attract the Union s attention <br>to the Transcaucasian region. Taking into account the EU new neighbours (countries of  joint <br>periphery ) it is also worth considering the Russian Federation factor both at level of the EU-<br>Russia relations and at the level of relations and commitments within the former Soviet Union <br>space. </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:934;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">The conclusion might be that the EU enlargement process seems realizable with political will to <br>mutual approach clearly expressed both by the elit and population of a candidate state and by <br>existing member states and European institutions.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1038;left:147"><nobr><span class="ft8"><i><b>Wider Union or almost  One Europe </b></i></span></nobr></DIV> </DIV> <!-- Page 16 --> <a name="16"></a> <DIV style="position:relative;width:918;height:1188;"> <STYLE type="text/css"> <!-- --> </STYLE> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Volodymyr Poselskyy</i></font></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:641"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Eurojournal.org, July 2004</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:71;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft1"><i>_____________________________________________________________________________________</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1114;left:794"><nobr><span class="ft2">16</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:106;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Guided by the European Commission Report  Programme 2000  For stronger and wider Union <br>the Luxembourg European Council of December 1997 initiated global, inclusive and <br>evolutionary process of institutional enlargement to the East, which was to include several steps <br>relevant to the rate of development and the level of readiness of every candidate country. Five <br>years later 15 old and 10 new member states confirmed persistent, inclusive and irreversible <br>character of the enlargement process as well as their desire to construct a  One Europe </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:207;left:756"><nobr><span class="ft5">20</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:210;left:768"><nobr><span class="ft2">. As a </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:231;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">result, the European Union is to become more than twice as large and to occupy geographically <br>almost the whole map of Europe except its Eastern part.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:293;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Despite its scale and complexity the current development of the European Community <br>corresponds completely with the set paradigms of the enlargement process. In this relation <br>Spanish researcher J. I. Torreblanca suggests viewing the EU enlargement to the Central and East <br>European countries in the light of accomodation between economic, security and institutional <br>interests of the member states and normative principles of the European Union (Torreblanca, <br>2003). This dynamic model of  negotiated accomodation is derived from particular essense of <br>the EU political system, namely: settled consensus culture that obliges the member states to look <br>for a compromise and repudiates the veto of any country if it is not properly grounded and its <br>removing is not conditioned; decentralised character of governance within the Community <br>( governance without governement ) that results in setting up unstable coalitions and <br>complicated interrelation of interests of numerous institutional actors in the process of adopting a <br>decision; incompleteness of institutional and political structure of the EU that can result in <br>vagueness, evolution and discrepancies of the EU statutory principles and rules (for instance, the <br>deepening versus widening debate).</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:603;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Under such conditions the EU enlargement process is carried out at the expense of concluding <br>package deals that enable meeting the Community s interests in general (a corresponding <br>adjustment to another expansion of European institutions and common policies) while <br>accomodating the interests of some member states, with any other enlargement move specifying <br>and intesifying statutory principles that member states are guided by when considering new <br>applications for membership. According to Torreblanca, at the time when the Berlin wall <br>collapsed the general normative doctrine of enlargement proceeded from the fact that the <br>European Community was open for all European democracies with market economies and ready <br>to admit and follow <i>acquis communautaire</i>. Thus, those member states, which objected to the EU <br>expansion to the East, had only two possibilities: to call into question the ability of a candidate <br>country to satisfy the accession criteria specifically detailed by the Copenhagen European <br>Council of June 1993; or to point out the inability of the Community itself for such enlargement.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:872;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Taking into account the general context of accomodating the interests of the member states and <br>the normative principles of enlargement the EU decisions on issuing the prospective membership <br>and initiating talks with the candidate country appear to be governing. It will be fair to define <br>three distinctive processes of the current enlargement of the European Union that is embracing <br>Central European countries, the West Balkans and Turkey.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:996;left:147"><nobr><span class="ft2">1. Inevitable but not urgent enlargement to the CEECs</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1038;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Recognising the dynamic character of europeanisation of Central European countries the <br>discussion on their joining the European Union rather quickly reduced to determining the </span></nobr></DIV> </DIV> <!-- Page 17 --> <a name="17"></a> <DIV style="position:relative;width:918;height:1188;"> <STYLE type="text/css"> <!-- --> </STYLE> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Volodymyr Poselskyy</i></font></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:641"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Eurojournal.org, July 2004</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:71;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft1"><i>_____________________________________________________________________________________</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1114;left:794"><nobr><span class="ft2">17</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:106;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">conditions for enlargement (the EU previous adaptation level, the adoption of phases and <br>participants of the enlargement process). Mutual rapprochement of the CEECs and the European <br>Union went through the following stages:</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:189;left:147"><nobr><span class="ft2">1.1. 1989  the first half of 1993</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:231;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">The period from democratic revolitions in Cenral European countries till the official recognition <br>of their candidate status can be characterised as a period of  deliberate ambiguity , during which <br>the Community neither objected to nor confirmed prospective membership for the CEECs. For <br>instance, the Preambles of the Association agreements concluded with Hungary and Poland in <br>December 1991 recognised only the desires expressed by both countries to join the Community <br>but not the consent of the Community itself</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:331;left:440"><nobr><span class="ft5">21</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:334;left:452"><nobr><span class="ft2">. French President F. Mitterrand even made the </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:355;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">public statement in June 1991 that enlargement to the East would be carried out after  decades <br>and decades of years to pass and suggested for that  indefinitely long transitional period not <br>going beyond establishing  a European Confederation that could unite all countries of the <br>continent (together with the still existing USSR) within the frames of a single organisation based <br>on exchanges, peace and security (Deloche-Gaudez, 1998). The recognition of prospective <br>membership in June 1993 (the Copenhagen Summit) was conditioned by clearly drawn accession <br>criteria and  compensated by three factors: excluding the most sensitive branches (agriculture, <br>textile, coal-mining and metallurgy industries) from the liberalised trade with the CEECs (within <br>the Association agreement); progress achieved in implementing the Maastricht Treaty (the <br>establishment of Economic and Monetary Union, in particular); doubling structural assistance for <br>less prosperous member states within the framework plan of the Union finance (Delors II <br>Package) for 1993-1999. All these elements with no timelimits taken together made it impossible <br>for the most reluctant members to reject issuing prospective membership for the CEECs.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:645;left:147"><nobr><span class="ft2">1.2. June 1993  December 1995</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:686;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">During this period almost all Central European countries (except the Czech Republic and <br>Slovenia) applied for accession. In its turn following up the initiative of Germany and the <br>European Commission the Essen Summit of December 1994 introduced the pre-accession <br>strategy regarding candidate countries aimed at promoting their integration into the EU domestic <br>market through realising  European agreements, determining priorities in the adoption of <i>acquis <br>communautaire</i> (approval of the White Paper Commission in May 1995) as well as building up <br>financial aid. Following up the demands of France, Spain and Italy the acceleration of the <br>enlargement to the East was  balanced by establishing the association with the Southern <br>Mediterranean (Euro-Mediterranean partnership). In addition to this the institutional reform of <br>1996 was to preceed the accession talks with the CEECs.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:914;left:147"><nobr><span class="ft2">1.3. December 1995  December 1997</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:955;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">The Madrid European Council of December 1995 was the first to set the probable date for <br>initiating talks on admitting the CEECs  6 months after successful conclusion of the <br>Intergovernmental Conference of 1996. In conformity with it, following the Amsterdam Treaty of <br>June 1997, the European Commission submitted the  Programme 2000 presenting in this <br>package deal its conclusions regarding the readiness of candidate countries, a new instrument of </span></nobr></DIV> </DIV> <!-- Page 18 --> <a name="18"></a> <DIV style="position:relative;width:918;height:1188;"> <STYLE type="text/css"> <!-- --> </STYLE> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Volodymyr Poselskyy</i></font></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:641"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Eurojournal.org, July 2004</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:71;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft1"><i>_____________________________________________________________________________________</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1114;left:794"><nobr><span class="ft2">18</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:106;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Accession Partnership, proposals on the Community budget for 1999-2006 and reforms in <br>Common policies.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:169;left:147"><nobr><span class="ft2">1.4. December 1997  December 2002</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:210;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">The Luxemburg Summit of December 1997 adopted the decision to initiate the accession talks <br>with 6 best prepared candidate countries and confirmed enhanced pre-accession strategy <br>regarding all the candidate countries, with the existing member states being certain that their <br>previous access to agricultural and structural funds had been preserved for 1999-2006 and <br>committing themselves to further reforming European institutions. In its turn the Helsinki <br>European Council of December 1999 acceeded to launching negotiations with the rest of <br>candidate countries, confirmed the schedule for another Intergovernmental Conference and <br>supported concluding the accession talks with the most successful candidate countries by the end <br>of 2002 provided the renovated Treaty was concludded and ratified. The Nice Summit Council of <br>December 2000 succeeded in finishing the current Intergovernmental Conference and scheduled <br>the CEEC s joining the EU  by June 2004, i.e. by carrying out new elections to the European <br>Parliament. Finally the accession negotiations with 10 candidate countries resulted in concluding <br>the Accession treaty (December, 2002), which after its signing (April, 2003) and ratification by <br>25 countries of the wider Union will come into effect 1 May 2004.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:520;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Following this, 8 Central European and Baltic countries will be able to join the Union 15 years <br>after the Berlin Wall collapse and 11 years after the recognition of their prospective membership. <br>During 2004-2006 the EU total net expenditures for new member states will not exceed 25 billion <br>euros (as much as 0,08 % the EU annual GDP). In future, the enlargement process will have <br>moderate impact on the EU budget as a whole and that of some countries of the  Old Europe <br>taking into account transition periods and restrictions set for new member states (regarding access <br>to agricultural and structural funds) as well as on further reforming common agricultural and <br>regional p olicies.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:707;left:133"><nobr><span class="ft2"> 2. Long unachievable but inevitable enlargement to the West Balkan countries</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:748;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">The European advancement of the West Balkan countries (Albania and the republics of the <br>former Yugoslavia except Slovenia) was hampered for decades of years due to tragic realia of <br>Yugoslavia s break-up accompanied by the former nomenclature elits holding power. The <br>situation radically changed in 1999-2000 owing to interrelation of external and internal factors. <br>The war in Kosovo once and for all convinced the Europeans that only institutinal accession to <br>the EU of all South-East European countries will help to solve the problem of  hard and  shaky <br>stabilisation of Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and <br>Albania as well as facilitate their democratic consolidation and overcoming economic <br>backwardness. The rise of the European prospect for the countries of the region coincided with <br>democratic pro-european forces coming to power in Croatia (after F. Tudjman s death) and the <br>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (overthrowing Milosevic s regime). Moreover, given the <br>accession negotiations starting with Bolgaria and Romania the West Balkans automatically turn <br>into the EU internal enclave. It is also worth mentioning that absorbing this internal periphery <br>will mean  digesting another Romania for the European Union especially taking into account <br>the total territory and population of the five countries. Hence, in June 1999 the EU Council <br>launched the process of stabilisation and association in the West Balkans that contemplated </span></nobr></DIV> </DIV> <!-- Page 19 --> <a name="19"></a> <DIV style="position:relative;width:918;height:1188;"> <STYLE type="text/css"> <!-- --> </STYLE> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Volodymyr Poselskyy</i></font></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:641"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Eurojournal.org, July 2004</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:71;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft1"><i>_____________________________________________________________________________________</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1114;left:794"><nobr><span class="ft2">19</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:106;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">concluding Stabilization and Association agreements and issuing the EU  full integrated <br>membership. A year later the Feira European Council reaffirmed that all the countries of the <br>region  are potential candidates for the EU membership .</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:189;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">In June 2003 the process of integrating the Balkan countries to the European Union entered <br>another stage after adopting the  European Integration Partnerships instrument, enhancing <br>political dialogue and technical aid, involving the countries of the region into various <br>programmes of the Community (in education, research area, culture, energy, environment, etc.). <br>Therefore, the process is the gradual transition from the basic stabilisation and association <br>instruments to the mechanisms of pre-accession strategy. The West Balkan countries joining the <br>EU is likely to extend and include several steps. The obvious leader of the West Balkan race is <br>Croatia, it has already applied for membership and hopes to catch up with such current <br>enlargement outsiders as Bolgaria and Romania. Macedonia and Albania can be the second to <br>cross the finish line, while Bosnia and Herzegovina together with Serbia and Montenegro will <br>need much more time to acquire <i>acquis communautaire</i> due to their instability, with the latter <br>being able to enlarge the Community with three more potential members, namely: Serbia, <br>Montenegro and Kosovo. It should also be mentioned that the enlargement to the South East of <br>Europe follows the way of package deals and compensations for the existing member states. <br>Proceeding from this we can claim that the current enhanced integration of the region followed <br>the proclamaition of the Wider Europe concept that anticipates further enlargement to the East for <br>at least mid-term perspective</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:518;left:312"><nobr><span class="ft5">22</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:520;left:325"><nobr><span class="ft2">. </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:562;left:147"><nobr><span class="ft2">3. Probable enlargement to Turkey </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:603;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">The Helsinki European Council of December 1999 unconditionally stated that Turkey is a <br>candidate country that has a calling for joining the European Union on the basis of the same <br>criteria that are applied to othe candidate countries and estended its full-fledged pre-accession <br>strategy on the country. Three years later the Copenhagen European Council reassured the pro-<br>european Turkish government that in December 2004 the European Union would adopt the <br>decision to launch the accession talks provided Turkey met the political precondition of the <br>Copenhagen criteria. Meanwhile, in its latest resolution on Turkey s application (May, 2003) the <br>European Parliament established that the country had not fulfilled the preconditions to launch <br>accession negotiations yet. Besides, the debate on the prospects of establishing democracy and <br>law-governed state in Turkey stambles over another obstacle, namely: the country s vast territory <br>along with its economic backwardness. With the present population growth rate being preserved, <br>Turkey will have 82 million people in 2015, which will provide it with the chance to claim the <br>status of the biggest and the most influential EU member state. Not exceeded 30 % of the annual <br>per capita GDP of the EU-15, Turkey has large and underdeveloped argicultural sector <br>(employing about 40 % labour force) and is distinct for considerable deviation of social and<br>economic development of its regions. Hence, Turkey, being an EU member State, would obtain <br>the lion s share of the EU agricultural and structural funds. Nevertheless, there is good ground for <br>the country to join the European Union in 2015 provided it gains democracy and furhter balances <br>its share in agricultural and structural funds in the expenditures part of the EU budget.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1018;left:147"><nobr><span class="ft8"><i><b>Wider Europe or how to enlarge the European Union without shifting its institutional </b></i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1038;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft8"><i><b>borders</b></i></span></nobr></DIV> </DIV> <!-- Page 20 --> <a name="20"></a> <DIV style="position:relative;width:918;height:1188;"> <STYLE type="text/css"> <!-- --> </STYLE> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Volodymyr Poselskyy</i></font></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:641"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Eurojournal.org, July 2004</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:71;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft1"><i>_____________________________________________________________________________________</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1114;left:794"><nobr><span class="ft2">20</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:106;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">The Wider Europe strategy (the WES) was confirmed by the Council of the EU in June 2003 on <br>the basis of the March Communication from the European Commission  Wider Europe  <br>Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Nieghbours . <br>The new doctrine found its institutional reflection in Article -56 of the European Constitution <br>draft that stipulates that  the Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring States, <br>aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the <br>Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation. For this purpose, <br>the Union may conclude and implement specific agreements& , which may contain reciprocal <br>rights and obligations as well as the possibility of undertaking activities jointly . In practice the <br>formula  everything except institutions grants the chances for reinforced economic integration <br>(gradual access to the Union s domestic market); for enhanced political dialogue; wider <br>application of visa-free regime; close cooperation on preventing and combatting conflicts and <br>crises, on judicial, domestic policy and legal assistance, on trans-boundary and regional <br>cooperation, transport, energy, telecommunications networks, culture, research area, education <br>and environmental protection; implementation of a new financial instrument of neighbourhood.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:438;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">By its juridical and practical aspects the WES fits the frames of the operating association <br>institution and according to the intentions of its founders it is to guarantee the integrity and <br>consistency of the Wider EU policy regarding its neighbour countries while being  an acceptable <br>alternative for membership </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:497;left:311"><nobr><span class="ft5">32</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:500;left:323"><nobr><span class="ft2"> for the countries. Strategically, the neighbourhood initiative puts </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:520;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">an  extremely ambicious (Wallace, 2003) task for itself to bring the EU relations with its <br>Southern and Eastern peripheries to the level of relations in the European economic area. In other <br>words, the EU neighbour countries can join the European geoeconomic space in exchange for <br>adopting the basic values of geopolitical Europe and a considerable share of <i>acquis <br>communautaire</i>. Reverting to the dilemma exposed in the preamble to this article, we can assert <br>that the EU decide to take the way of close association this time, which helps to avoid further <br>attempts of institutional and budget adaptation for a mid-term perspective, at least, that would <br>result from another enlargement to the East European countries.<br>Working out a single strategy in relations with the Mediterranean and East European countries <br>can be substantiated by a number of factors: certain resemblance of their social and economic <br>characteristics (the problems of stabilisation, democratisation, inefficient governance and <br>poverty); valuable historic, cultural, economic and social links that connect the neighbour <br>countries with the wider EU; challenges of the geographical neighbourhood itself (the regulation <br>of frontier exchanges and the combatting of common security threats). In relation to this <br>outstanding researcher Michael Emerson suggests regarding the WES as a  the European Union s <br>friendly Monro Doctrine that proclaims East European and the Greater Middle East countries <br>(the Southern Mediterranean, the Arab Peninsula and Iran)  the EU s area of vital interest <br>(Emerson, 2002). Furthermore, the determination of common grounds and criteria for <br>raproachement between the EU and neighbour countries derive from the necessity to promote <br>sustainablity and consistency of foreign-policy efforts of the wider EU that can find it <br>complicated to coordinate the interests of its old and new Member States.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:976;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Along with this the WES grounds on a differential and step-by-step approach following which <br>every neighbour country will be offered an individual Action Plan, and in compliance with this <br>the integration to the EU domestic market will be carried out taking into account the fulfillment <br>of the Action Plan and the established general accession criteria. The suggested scheme follows <br>the three-componental raproachement formula that the EU successfully applied to the Central </span></nobr></DIV> </DIV> <!-- Page 21 --> <a name="21"></a> <DIV style="position:relative;width:918;height:1188;"> <STYLE type="text/css"> <!-- --> </STYLE> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Volodymyr Poselskyy</i></font></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:641"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Eurojournal.org, July 2004</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:71;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft1"><i>_____________________________________________________________________________________</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1114;left:794"><nobr><span class="ft2">21</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:106;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">European countries (annual monitoring carried out by the Commission, the EU Action Plans and <br>national Programmes of their realisation adopted by neighbour countries) with the significant <br>distinction that the aim is profound association rather than membership. Taking into account <br>those difficulties and mutual frustration that characterise the EU current relations with Ukraine, <br>Moldova and the majority of the Southern Mediterranean the neighbourhood concept makes an <br>important step forward because it fills the relations with actual and binding sense for both sides.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:251;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">At the same time the WES calls for deeper analysis in the context of global postcommunist <br>evolution of the continent. As the beginning of this article says, the collapse of communist <br>regimes in East European countries spurred vivid discussion about new arrangements in the <br> common European home . In this connection some European politicians and experts supported <br>either the establishment of a pan-european confederation (F! Mitterrand, Jacques Delors, the <br>1998 Report of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe) or the establishment of a <br>special membership status on the basis of flexible and partial implementation of the <i>acquis <br></i>(Jacques Attali, Charles Grant). Instead of the current and long-term enlargement process such a <br>scenario would foster institutional and geopolitical adjustment of new East European <br>democracies to the European Union. The associated membership formula could embrace all <br>European countries that meet the democracy criterion but either temporarily fail to meet other <br>criteria or do not strive for full membership (the CIS European countries, the Balkan countries, <br>the Common Economic Area, Swtzerland, Turkey)</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:497;left:471"><nobr><span class="ft5">23</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:500;left:483"><nobr><span class="ft2">. </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:541;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">The suggested neighbourhood concept grounds on opposite fundamental, i.e. gradual economic <br>integration that not only remains within the frames of the existing institution of association, but <br>also spreads over non-european neighbour countries of the EU. The WES contradicts, therefore, <br>the proclaimed paradigm of a One Europe because it regards East European countries not as <br>potential candidates for membership that can join the EU on condition of meeting the accession <br>criteria, but as close foreign-policy partners of the Union. For lack of new institutional <br>mechanisms it would be appropriate to spread the integration strategy, which is gradual, full-<br>fledged and conditioned by actual integration results, over those East European countries that <br>expressed their strive for membership following the pattern of the stabilisation and association <br>process carried out by Brussels in the West Balkan countries. In consequence, the concept of <br>Wider Europe can be accounted in Ukraine and Moldova as a strategy of constraining the <br>integration intentions of these countries rather than an effective way of their approaching the <br>European Union.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:831;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">In fact it seems most appropriate to consider the WES to be the prolongation of the EU policy of <br> deliberate uncertainty carried out regarding the CIS European countries. Despite the fact that <br>some present leaders of the European Commission and some Member States repeatedly <br>expressed the vision of an  ideal Europe without its Eastern part, the nieghbourhood concept <br>never excludes the possibility for East European countries to be issued the prospective <br>membership. As Romano Prodi admitted  so whatever our proximity policy is or will be no <br>European state that complies with the Copenhagen criteria ... will be denied this prospect (R. <br>Prodi, decembre 2002). On the contrary, the WES and probable neighbourhood agreements can <br>become an effective means of reaching the aim because they offer even more (full access to the <br>EU domestic market) than Association agreements with the CEECs that envisaged only setting up <br>free trade zones with the EU. </span></nobr></DIV> </DIV> <!-- Page 22 --> <a name="22"></a> <DIV style="position:relative;width:918;height:1188;"> <STYLE type="text/css"> <!-- --> </STYLE> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Volodymyr Poselskyy</i></font></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:641"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Eurojournal.org, July 2004</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:71;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft1"><i>_____________________________________________________________________________________</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1114;left:794"><nobr><span class="ft2">22</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:106;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft2">In practice the WES includes three groups of neighbour countries:</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:148;left:147"><nobr><span class="ft2">1. European countries of  common periphery striving for the EU membership</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:189;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">The wait-and-see attitude the European Union demostrates to the East European countries that <br>since now on constitute  common close neighbourhood for the Wider Union and the Russian <br>Federation dooms the current East European policy of the EU to a conceptual failure. In other <br>words, the European economic area model, to which the WES orients, does not strategically <br>correspond to the new Eastern periphery of the Community. It is obvious that these East <br>European countries have ony two possible scenarios for development, i.e. actual democratic and <br>market reforms and gradual institutional integration to the EU resulting from democratic forces <br>coming to power; further  declarative europeanisation (Wolchuk, 2003) and raproachement <br>between them and Russia in case the current authorities in the countries do not qualitatively <br>transform. At the same time, we regard as unlikely the scenario by which East European <br>countries acquire the main part of <i>acquis communautaire</i> and shape together with the EU the <br> area of welfare and common values retaining the status of  neighbours or  friends rather than <br>wishing to become full-fledged members of the European family. According to the EEA <br>functioning experience, this form of profound economic integration puts the Union s partners into <br>an unfavourable position since it compels them to acquire more and more elements of <i>acquis <br>communautaire</i> having no possibility to influence their adoption. It is not surprising that under <br>such conditions the majority of potential candidates to join the EEA found it much better to be <br>issued full EU membership (Austria, Finland, Sweden) or, at least, make an attempt in this <br>respect (national referendum failures in Norway and Switzerland). After Norway joins the <br>European Union, which is most probable, the EEA can reduce to tiny Iceland and Liechtenstein <br>besides the EU countries.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:645;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">At present Moldova and Ukraine have stated their intention to join the European Union. A new <br>leadership of Georgia stresses the European future for his country. Yet the authoritative regime of <br>Lukashenko together with Armenia impaired by the fight for Nagorny Karabakh are attracted by <br>Russia, while Azerbaijan is close to establishing the Aliev dynasty regime under the patterns of <br>despotisms set up in Central Asia. Thus, taking into account compliance with the first two basic <br>criteria of membership the number of potential members of EU increases only by 2-3 countries <br>(from preplanned 33 to 35-36 countries). Moreover, Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia have not <br>solved the main tasks of stabilisation and basic europeanisation yet, though these countries (or, <br>at least, some of the countries ) way to sustainable democracy, law-goverened state and efficient <br>market economy can be overcome much faster than during  several decades of years </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:828;left:717"><nobr><span class="ft5">24</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:831;left:729"><nobr><span class="ft2">.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:872;left:147"><nobr><span class="ft2">2.  Wider Russia </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:914;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">As distinct from Ukraine and Moldova,  the most important neighbour (Pelczynska-Nalecz, <br>2002) of the European Union, which is the Russian Federation, would seem to  fit the doctrine <br>of Wider Europe perfectly.  As a world power situated on two continents </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:952;left:667"><nobr><span class="ft5">25</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:955;left:680"><nobr><span class="ft2">, Russia considers </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:976;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">itself to be an equal strategic partner (of one of the poles of a bipolar world) rather than a <br>potential EU member. Strategic partnership between the European Union and Russia anticipates <br>gradual establishment of four common spaces (Common European Economic Space (CEES); <br>Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice; the Commun Space of External Security; The <br>Common Space of Research and Education), launching the work of the EU-Russia Permanent </span></nobr></DIV> </DIV> <!-- Page 23 --> <a name="23"></a> <DIV style="position:relative;width:918;height:1188;"> <STYLE type="text/css"> <!-- --> </STYLE> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Volodymyr Poselskyy</i></font></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:641"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Eurojournal.org, July 2004</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:71;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft1"><i>_____________________________________________________________________________________</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1114;left:794"><nobr><span class="ft2">23</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:106;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Partnership Council, profound energy dialogue as well as cooperation in environmental realm. <br>Though it is intersting to note that the EU-Russia relations actually exceed the neighbourhood <br>initiative and, therefore, are subject to neither regular monitoring carried out by the European <br>Commission nor strict compliance with the adopted progress criteria. According to the joint <br>Declaration of the Sankt-Peterburg EU-Russia Summit of May 31, 2003 the process of <br>raproachement between the Community and Russia will be carried out on the  equal basis as <br>well as on the basis of determined  specific tasks and mutual agreement .</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:272;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">One can forecast that the relations between the EU and Russia will develop through complex and <br>sometimes uncompromise dialogue on mutual trade concessions, wider application of visa-free <br>regime and foreign policy issues. There also exist serious hidden dangers threatening the EU-<br>Russia strategic partnership. In contradiction with declared commonness of values the EU and <br>Russia have rather different views on the tasks, priorities and prospects of mutual partnership. <br>Despite certain achievements in economic sphere Putin s Russia is far from meeting the <br>Copenhagen criteria and pursues the classical foreign policy doctrine based on the priority <br>protection of national interests and traditional geopolitical approach (Lynch, 2003). In addition to <br>considering the  internal problem of Chechnya the European Union should coordinate its <br>strategic partnership with Russia and the proclaimed tasks of  europeanisation of the East <br>European periphery. The matter is that Russia is definitely not fascinated with profound <br>democratic and market transformation of new East European countries and close raproachement <br>between them and the European Union</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:518;left:409"><nobr><span class="ft5">26</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:520;left:421"><nobr><span class="ft2">. Russian leadership believe that the former Soviet </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:541;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">republics can move to the European Union only together with Russia, i.e. within the regional <br>association set up and controled by the Kremlin. It is remarkable that along with negotiating the <br>establishment of the CEES with the EU Russia is simultaneously making attempts to establish the <br>Common Economic Space with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Avoiding the penetration into <br>obvious discrepancies of such a dual profound economic integration, it is worth emphasizing that <br>the post-Soviet Russia severely hampers internal democratisation and stabilisation in the East of <br>Europe (backing up athoritative regimes of Lukashenko and Kuchma, resisting Moldova and <br>Georgia in their attempts to find solutions for the Trans-Dniester and Abkhasian conflicts). Yet <br>Belarus is the only country out of 6 belonging to  common periphery that actually belongs to the <br>Russian geopolitical and geoeconomic space.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:769;left:133"><nobr><span class="ft2"> 3. Non-European neighbours of the EU</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:810;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Following the demand of France and Spain the neighbourhood initiative was extended to the <br>South Mediterranean, which, as these countries and the European Commission belive, is expected <br>to enhance the existing mechanisms of Euro-Mediterranean partnership (the Barcelona Process). <br>The importance of this mainly Muslim region for the European Union is determined not only by <br>the current global fight against terrorism, but also is conditioned by a number of stable <br>components, i.e. geographical and historical proximity, close economic ties, the existence of <br>numerous Muslim minorities in the EU countries, considerable destabilising potential of the <br>region (Palestina and Israel conflict, the Iraq war, substantial  weak risks of illegal <br>immagration). Taking it all into account the European Union is vitally concerned with arranging <br>balanced intercultural and intercivilizational dialogue with Arab Muslim world as well as its <br>modernisationa and democratisation. The Wider Europe formula conceptually corresponds to the <br>wish of the King of Morocco who appealed to the EU to establish special relations that would <br>offer  a bit less than a membership and a bit more than an association. </span></nobr></DIV> </DIV> <!-- Page 24 --> <a name="24"></a> <DIV style="position:relative;width:918;height:1188;"> <STYLE type="text/css"> <!-- --> </STYLE> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Volodymyr Poselskyy</i></font></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:641"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Eurojournal.org, July 2004</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:71;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft1"><i>_____________________________________________________________________________________</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1114;left:794"><nobr><span class="ft2">24</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:127;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">At the same time, as 8 years of experience of the Barcelona process proved, the Euro-<br>Mediterranean partnership met several serious obstacles, the main of which is considerable <br>differences in civilizational and current political development of the parties. Israel and, probably, <br>Lebanon are the only countries of the Northern Africa and Middle East that can satisfy the <br>political requirement of the Copenhagen criteria. In other words, there is no considering the <br> europeanisation of these countries following the CCEE pattern, we can only speak about their <br>gradual social and economic modernisation and democratisation following their own patterns. In <br>this respect, the impossibility for the South Mediterranean to join the European Union is <br>conditioned not only by geographical realia but also by not less obvious  geography of values </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:290;left:780"><nobr><span class="ft5">27</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:293;left:793"><nobr><span class="ft2">. </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:355;left:147"><nobr><span class="ft8"><i><b>Europe as a dream for unity</b></i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:396;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">In his well-known lecture course delivered in 1944-1945 French historian Lucien Febvre <br>characterised the European idea as  a dream for unity . At dawn of the %% century the dream <br>that seemed unattainable for many generations of the Europeans is close to becoming a reality. <br>The ideal model of a united Europe could include two or, probably, three concentric circles. The <br>main circle (One Europe) would include 25 Member States of the present enlarged Union, <br>Bolgaria, Romania, the West Balkan countries, Moldova, Ukraine, Turkey and the <br>Transcaucasian countries. The outer circle (Wider Europe) would include European countries that <br>do not strive for joining the EU institutionally as well as non-European neighbours from the <br>Northern Africa and Middle East. The Wider Europe countries would shape the Common <br>European Economic Space founded on the Pan-European and Mediterranean free trade zone. In <br>the course of time the probable inner circle (deeper Europe) would be founded on the <br>mechanisms of enhanced cooperation shaped by those EU countries that would strive for deeper <br>integration forms than <i>acquis communautaire</i> accepted by everyone, with any European state <br>having the right to join any of the three circles under the conditional openness principle provided <br>it met the set criteria.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:727;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">As has been mentioned before, the present concept of the Wider Europe makes it possible for any <br>European democracy to seek the EU membership. A possible rejection can be conditioned by two <br>fundamental postulates: the inability of a candidate country to satisfy the accession criteria; the <br>inability of the Union itself for such enlargement.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:831;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">The application of periodic monitoring and Action plans in relations with the East European <br>countries enables an integral and objective assessment of their progressive movement towards the <br>EU. Along with this, it is much more difficult to estimate the readiness of the Union itself, <br>because such an analysis bases largely on subjective views of some member states rather than on <br>clearly distinguished criteria. Nowadays some West European leaders and the European <br>Commission leadership deny <i>a-priori </i>the possibility of the further enlargement of the European <br>Community to the East European countries, justifying it with the necessity  to preserve the <br>internal balance and cohesion of the Union (Prodi, December, 2003).</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1017;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Such reasoning, however, brings about some questions. First, as the President of the European <br>Commission stated concerning the current enlargement, the efficient structure of the Community <br> completely depends on the clear division of powers between European institutions and current </span></nobr></DIV> </DIV> <!-- Page 25 --> <a name="25"></a> <DIV style="position:relative;width:918;height:1188;"> <STYLE type="text/css"> <!-- --> </STYLE> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Volodymyr Poselskyy</i></font></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:641"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Eurojournal.org, July 2004</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:71;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft1"><i>_____________________________________________________________________________________</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1114;left:794"><nobr><span class="ft2">25</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:106;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">procedures. It is hundreds of times as easy to work within the 27-member Union according to the <br>majority vote principle as within the EU-15 that adopt decisions according to the unanimity <br>principle (Prodi, 2001). Granted the successful adoption of the draft Constitutional Treaty, the <br>institutional and political structure of the European Union will become qualitatively renewed, <br>which means: transition to a duel-majority system of adopting decisions by qualified majority in <br>the EU Council of Ministers </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:207;left:328"><nobr><span class="ft5">28</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:210;left:341"><nobr><span class="ft2">; further narrowing the sphere of application of the unanimous </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:231;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">voting procedure etc. One can assume that, granted the implementation of the new Constitutional <br>Treaty (approximately in 2009) and its most likely further reform, the European Union</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:251;left:744"><nobr><span class="ft2"> will be </span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:272;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">capable of expanding farther beyond the currently coordinated Eastern land border. Moreover, <br>the probable EU enlargement to Turkey will require further reforms in common agricultural and <br>structural policies, which, in its turn, could facilitate the integration of underdeveloped East <br>European countries.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:376;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Second, the idea of  internal inability of the Community to enlarge cannot at all be applied to <br>Moldova and the Transcaucasian countries that are small by both size and population number. <br>The European Union, which from the present 15 members (377 million people) is planning to <br>enlarge to 32 (500 million people) or 33 (570 million people together with Turkey) members, is <br>quite capable of absorbing Ukraine with less than 50 million population. Actually the real threat <br>to the integrity and domestic political balance of the European Union can be posed by the<br>probable enlargement to biggest country of the continent  the Russian Federation  and, to a less <br>extent, to Turkey (taking into account its stable demographic growth). The issue of the EU <br>prospective membership for Russia is not to be on the agenda of the Union until the Russian <br>leadership files the application for accession. However, such a scenario seems to be unlikely even <br>supposing that Russian currently weak democratic forces and civil society will manage to <br>transform the present model of Putin s  guided democracy into a sustainable democratic <br>government. The matter is that even European and democratic Russia will logically strive for <br>remaining one of the world s poles of influence and, accordingly, will not express desire to lose <br>its independence in adopting decisions and to concede a significant part of its sovereignity in <br>favour of the European Union.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:727;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Naturally, the European Union is not obliged to admit the countries of the  common periphery . <br>Yet the leaders of the One Europe should be aware of the consequences of such a political <br>decision. As was the case with the Western Balkans, the strengthening of stability, democracy <br>and prosperity in East European countries is possible only in view of their prospective full <br>institutional integration to the EU. Thus, the Wider Union faces the following alternative: either <br>purposeful support of internal democratic and economic transformations on Ukraine, Moldova <br>and the Transcaucasian countries with their further institutional and budget adjustment to <br> absorbtion or consent to border on weak authoritative regimes that can pose the danger of <br>potential or existing conflicts and constant  weak threats .</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:934;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">There is no doubt that the pace of progress of East European countries to the One Europe will be <br>determined primarily by the pace of their internal progress towards the EU common values and <br>standards. In this respect, Ukraine, which is the European country that has not determined its <br>position yet, could go through the following three-stages striving for the EU membership the <br>initial point for which must be the victory of the leader of the Ukrainian democratic opposition at <br>the coming Presidential elections (autumn 2004):</span></nobr></DIV> </DIV> <!-- Page 26 --> <a name="26"></a> <DIV style="position:relative;width:918;height:1188;"> <STYLE type="text/css"> <!-- --> </STYLE> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Volodymyr Poselskyy</i></font></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:54;left:641"><nobr><span class="ft0"><i>Eurojournal.org, July 2004</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:71;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft1"><i>_____________________________________________________________________________________</i></span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:1114;left:794"><nobr><span class="ft2">26</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:106;left:147"><nobr><span class="ft2">1. To become the best neighbour (2004  2009)</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:148;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">The new Ukrainian leadership finally launches a large-scale programme of europeanisation and <br>social and economic modernisation of the country. Simultaneously Ukraine obtains the WTO <br>membership, reaches the EU consent to establish free trade zones and gradually incorporates the <br>priorities of the <i>acquis communautaire</i> (including probable but not obligatory conclusion of a <br>new neighbourhood agreement between the EU and Ukraine). As a result, Ukraine can expect to <br>be granted the status of one of  the best nieghbours of the EU.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:293;left:147"><nobr><span class="ft2">2. To become a candidate country for the EU membership (2009  2012)</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:334;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">Receiving the European Commission s approval of its first success and enlisting the preliminary <br>support of the  East European lobby within the frames of the Wider Union Ukraine applies to <br>the EU for accession. Taking into account the achieved results and reforms the European Union <br>has no other choice than to issue a candidate country status for Ukraine and approve the decision <br>to launch the accession negotiations.</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:458;left:133"><nobr><span class="ft2"> 3.To become a member state (2012  2019)</span></nobr></DIV> <DIV style="position:absolute;top:500;left:106"><nobr><span class="ft7">At this final raproachement stage Ukraine and the EU start the full liberalisation of mutual trade <br>and conduct the accession negotiations. Along with this, the Common Euro