Still, indirect reciprocity as defined above has to face three serious
difficulties, the third one being the most general one. First, maxim 1
presupposes the idea that we have obligations towards earlier
generations, hence towards dead people as well. For it is they who
are supposed to generate our obligations towards the next
generation. Still, for a state to justify its sustainable development
policies on the basis of obligations towards dead people seems
rather incompatible with the requirement of a minimal neutrality
towards the various conceptions of the good life as well as towards
the variety of metaphysical views. Indeed, it can be shown that
obligations towards the dead only make sense if we can claim that
dead people do exist in a morally relevant sense. Such an
assumption is probably far from shared by a majority among us.
Second, Maxim 1 cannot be applied to a hypothetical first generation,
since the latter would not - by definition – have received anything
from any generation preceding it. This theory is therefore unable to
tell us what would be wrong in a first generation squandering a
significant part of the capital it began with. Third – and finally -,
there is an even more serious difficulty. The very idea of reciprocity
is problematic if one aims at using it as a basis for a full theory of
justice. For example, for all those who consider – in the
intragenerational context - that a person suffering from a major
genetic disability should be granted at least decent social benefits,
this could in principle only be done – for those willing to remain
within a reciprocity framework – if we can reasonably expect this
person to give us the equivalent in return in the future. Once we
accept the reasonable assumption that most of us would want
society - in the intragenerational context - to grant such a person
with social benefits irrespectively of her ability to give something in
return, we have to ask ourselves why this idea of reciprocity should
remain at the heart of our theory of intergenerational justice. Hence,
there are good reasons to look for other possible views.
replaces the original benefactor (here : the current generation). To
take a family-based example, children (Generation 3) will be
provided with generous funding for university studies at will by -
or will inherit family photos from - their parents (Generation 2) “in
return” for the fact that their grandparents (Generation 1) did the
same for their own children (Generation 2).
Notice that this standard view is only one out of three possible
models of intergenerational reciprocity. Indeed, one alternative
indirect reciprocity model goes in the opposite direction : the
current generation owes something to the previous one because of
what the previous one did for the one that preceded it. This is the
case with “pay-as-you-go” pension schemes. Generation 2 (those
who are currently active) owes retirement benefits to the members
of Generation 1 (those who are now retiring) on the understanding
that Generation 3 (those who did not enter the labour market yet)
will do the same for Generation 2 in the future. And there is as well
the theoretical if not practical possibility of a model of
intergenerational justice built strictly on direct reciprocity grounds.
This can be illustrated by Cosandey’s « double reciprocity » view
<5> according to which we owe something to the previous
generation in return for what they have given us and we owe
something to the next one in return for what they will give us.
The standard indirect reciprocity view is a rather robust theory that
is immune to various possible objections. For example, we can
answer the query of those asking why a mere gift could ever give
rise to an obligation to give in return. For this objection can be
rejected by underlining the fact that such a generation should be
regarded as a free rider generation. It takes advantage of the
intergenerational train without paying its ticket, hence benefiting
without reciprocity from the sacrifices made by earlier generations.