The rise and fall of states: some constitutional modelling
( . . . )
1.2 The rise and fall of civilisations – some theoretical explanations
Let us first return briefly to the consideration of environmental factors upon the economic
growth of civilisations. That group of scholars which emphasised the pivotal influence of
geography may be typified by McNeill (9) He argued that the West’s growth was due to its
resource base and to political competition that encouraged innovation. The latter variable may
be seen as institutional – at least to some degree – but the former is explicitly environmental.
In a similar vein Jones noted that the mountain chains and marshes of Europe formed barriers
that prevented a single dominant state from evolving (10). In the absence of this dominance a
dynamic tension was created, between relatively evenly matched states, which encouraged the
creation and dissemination of ideas, competition (both state and individual, with all levels
between).
Diamond also emphasised geography, especially the abundant rainfall and the favourable
effects of an indented coastline and high mountains on political evolution (11). The rainfall
allowed and encouraged stable and reliable settled agriculture, which in turn led to the
establishment of settled communities. The coastline provided numerous opportunities for the
establishment of cities and towns based upon commerce. The high mountains created natural
barriers, carving up the continent into conveniently-sized pieces, each of which evolved into a
stable political entity. It might be argued that the rainfall and coastline argument goes some
way to explaining the development of civilisation in its earliest stages, but that it does not go
far enough to explaining the modern success of the European states. It could however be
argued that the agricultural stability, and coastal trade, allowed the states that had developed
between the mountain chains to maintain and preserve their independence into modern times,
and so allowed then to benefit from the dynamic tension of the intellectual revolutions from
the twelfth century onwards.
Landes also laid much emphasis upon Europe’s temperate climate, which allowed the
population to accumulate a surplus above a subsistence level (12). In contrast China’s
environmental conditions allowed generally stable peasant agriculture that was characterised
by plenty in good times (that did not encourage the pursuit of surplus and so the development
of a strong middle class), but destructive and destabilising famine in bad years. But he also
promoted a cultural hypothesis, which might be characterised as a belief that the defining
element in Western growth and development was a more dynamic European culture (13).
This ‘environmental’ argument assumed that one culture might be more dynamic than
another. This could be explained as being the result of a permanent state of imbalance
(dynamic tension), or it might reflect the greater dynamism of an evolving culture – such as
Europe’s was from the end of the Dark Ages. This latter argument would help explain why
the Crusades from the twelfth century onwards proved to be of such a lasting benefit to
Europe. Not only was lost classical and all but lost Greek knowledge re-acquired, along with
the newer Islamic learning, but the innovation and rapid growth that this engendered – and the
evolution of modern states brought about by the political and military aspects of the Crusades
– led to an intellectual blossoming in Western Europe, a challenging of received knowledge
generally.
9 William McNeill, The Rise of the West (Chicago, 1963), p. 114.
10 Eric L. Jones, The European Miracle: Environments, Economies, and Geopolitics
in the History of Europe and Asia (2nd ed., Cambridge, 1987), p. 226;
The Record of Global Economic Development (Cheltenham, 2002).
11 Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies
(London, 1997), pp. 409-12.
12 David S. Landes, The wealth and poverty of Nations: why some are so rich
and some so poor (New York, 1998).
13 David S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change
and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present
(Cambridge, 1969); Revolution in Time – Clocks and the making of the Modern World
(New York, 1983).
8
To Landes, and others who emphasised environmental factors, this dynamic evolution was
due, at least in part, to the physical environment of Europe. The existence of plentiful and
reliable rainfall could scarcely be enough, however, as the key element that led to the
development of this region, for parts of the tropics enjoyed much higher rainfall, but never
developed significant civilisations. To the environmentalist this too could be accounted for,
being the result of excessively high temperatures (with an enervating effect on the human
inhabitants, and the discouragement of complex clothing- and house-making), or an overabundance
of natural resources (with a similar effect).
Water is an importance element in the human condition, whether it is rainfall or not (and
reliable), as well as the shape of the coastline (allowing safe harbours for ships), and the
existence of rivers, allowing for inland navigation, irrigation, or providing a reliable water
supply (and also sewerage system). Water was especially important in the thinking of
Wittfogel. His hydraulic hypothesis contends that despotic governments often arose around
rivers, as in ancient Egypt, China, and Mesopotamia. For him the presence – or indeed
absence – of water was the single most important element in the development of the state. He
developed the theory that the state arose when villages joined together to develop common
irrigation projects (not necessarily due to free choice, but rather out of necessity, due to the
physical environment). This co-operation, in Wittfogel’s mode, greatly improved the
productivity of agriculture (14). But the next step, according to Wittfogel, was less beneficial.
Once the state came into being as a means of developing irrigation (and it might be
questioned how the co-operation of a group of villages can constitute a state), it soon
inherently applied its bureaucracy to oppressive purposes (15). In fact, according to Wittfogel,
what he termed an hydraulic state will cease appropriating only when the marginal cost of
further administrative control begins to exceed the marginal revenue to those benefiting from
state action (16). This is fundamentally a technology-driven model of the state (17).
While this model might be of particular relevance to more primordial and less
sophisticated states than are found today, it nevertheless illustrates the dependence of states
on their physical environment (18). He correctly identified centralised bureaucratic empire in
China as inhibiting Chinese science, technology and economic development. But his central
premise did not give sufficient weight to the fact that Chinese water management was mostly
small-scale and local. Nor can this hypothesis explain the recent relative backwardness of
Eastern Europe, or the success (albeit relatively short-term), of the Hittite empire, whose
14 He wrote that:
In a landscape characterised by full aridity permanent agriculture becomes possible
only if and when coordinated human action transfers a plentiful and accessible water
supply from its original location to a potentially fertile soil. When this is done,
government-led hydraulic enterprise is identical with the creation of agricultural life.
This first and crucial moment may therefore be designated as the ‘administrative creation
point.’
– Karl A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven, 1957), p. 109.
15 Ibid., pp. 126–36.
16 Wittfogel wrote that:
The power of the hydraulic despotism is unchecked (‘total’), but it does not operate everywhere.
The life of most individuals is far from being completely controlled by the state;
and there are many villages and other corporate units that are not totally controlled either.
What keeps despotic power from asserting its authority in spheres of life? Modifying a key
formula of classical economics, we may say that the representatives of the hydraulic regime
act (or refrain from acting) in response to the law of diminishing administrative returns.
– Ibid., pp. 108–9. In Roman times whole districts were laid waste by the depredation of the tax
collectors. See, generally, Jean Andreau, Banking and business in the Roman world,
trans. Janet Lloyd (Cambridge, 1999).
17 For more on this argument, see Noel Cox, Technology and Legal Systems (Aldershot, 2006).
18 Karl A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven, 1957).
9
capital Hattusa was largely devoid of natural water (19). But he correctly saw Latin America and
Russia as failing due to the existence of large landowners or the concentration of land
ownership, and the tradition of authoritarian governments, and the failure of the merchant
class to develop fully. He did not, however, explore the causes of these factors.
Finally, in a small selection of advocates for this approach, Pomeranz focused upon the
stocks of coal, and access to the resources of the Americas (20). For him, the economic explosion
in Europe from the fifteenth century was due to the availability of these new resources. This
however fails to explain the subsequent development of intellectual ideas and industrialisation
in the United Kingdom, which did not obtain those resources, and the relative decline of
Spain and Portugal, which did. The latter has, of course, been blamed on the sheer richness of
the new continent – Spain collapse amid an embarrassment of riches. But is has also been
ascribed to the political or religious conditions of the peninsula.
The second group among the rising/declining civilisations theorists gave pre-eminence to
institutions, particularly what they saw as economic institutions. North argued that the
structure of a society’s political and economic institutions determines the performance of its
economy and its rate of technological change. This is because institutions define the degree to
which property rights are protected and contracts enforced – the cost of transactions, or the
transactional cost (21). This can be seen as primarily an economic model.
Josselin and Marciano suggested that by constraining the growth of the public sector, a
country’s legal system can and probably will have a considerable impact on its
development (22). This could be described as the ‘arteriosclerosis’ argument, though the
constraint is not necessarily unconscious; it may be the result of deliberate and conscious
choice. However, the greater the degree of freedom of choice, the greater the likelihood that
this choice will lead to innovations. Conversely, if little choice is offered, by a stifling legal
code, or archaic and inefficient administrative procedures or political apparatus, there is little
incentive for innovation. Innovation might indeed be positively discouraged, for political,
religious or cultural reasons. In the late eighteenth century the Chinese imperial reply to the
tentative overtures of a British trade commission led by Earl Macartney was that ‘Our empire
possesses all things in prolific abundance (23).
But focusing primarily upon the growth of the public sector perhaps undervalues the
positive consequences of a bureaucracy, in guarding against the unjust acquisition of property
or ideas from others.
Lal took a different approach, arguing that the West’s success was due to cultural factors.
These included cosmological beliefs, political decentralisation and what he called ‘the
inquisitive Greek mind’ (24). For him the structure of governmental institutions was a
consequence of underlying cultural factors, and not in themselves a cause.
19 O.R. Gurney, The Hittites (2nd edn., Harmondsworth, 1990).
20 Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: Europe, China and the making
of the modern World Economy (Princeton, 2000).
21 Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History (London, 1981),
p. 171; Douglass C. North, Institutions, institutional change and economic
performance (Cambridge, 1990), p. 27.
22 Jean-Michel Josselin and Alain Marciano, ‘The Paradox of Leviathan:
how to develop and contain the future
European state’, European Journal of Law and Economics, 4 (1997): 5-21.
23 In 1793 Macartney was followed by 600 packages of presents, borne by 3,000 coolies.
But his refusal to go down on both knees to the Chinese emperor (‘kowtow’, or kòu tóu)
meant that his request for permission to open Chinese ports to British trade was turned down;
Sir George Staunton, An account of Macartney’s embassy to China (London, 1797); Sir John
Barrow, Some Account of the Public Life, and a Selection from the Unpublished Writings,
of the Earl of Macartney (London, 1807); Helen Macartney Robbins, Our First Ambassador
to China: An Account of the Life of George, Earl of Macartney (London, 1908). See also,
for later initiatives, G. Melancon, ‘Peaceful Intentions: The First British Trade Commission in
China, 1833-5’, Historical Research, 73 (180) (2000): 33-47.
24 Deepak Lal, Unintended consequences: the impact of factor endowments, culture,
and politics on long run economic performance (Cambridge, 1998), p. 173.
10
Huff examines the cultural – religious, legal, philosophical, and institutional – contexts
within which science was practised in the disparate cultures of Islam, China, and the West. He
finds in the history of (European) law and the European cultural revolution of the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries what he saw as major clues as to why the ethos of science arose in the
West, permitting the breakthrough to modern science that did not occur elsewhere. It might be
countered that any argument based on the preconception that ‘modern science’ is
predominantly western, or that it is inherently different to pre-modern science is skewed.
However, Huff’s line of inquiry leads to novel ideas about the centrality of the legal concept
of corporation, which is unique to the west (at least as the ‘corporation’ is understood in the
modern west). This concept gave rise, according to Huff, to the concepts of neutral space and
free inquiry (25).
For Huff, free inquiry was limited in Islam due to the educational system which that
religious engendered. Madrassas (26) were aimed at teaching two classes of science, and legal
systems (or jurisprudence with associated logic, analysis and metaphysics). There were
‘Prophetic sciences’ and ‘foreign sciences’. The former was actually based on logic systems
whose boundaries were very clearly drawn: the prophetic sciences were in line with the
concept of upholding ‘divinity’ as revealed by the Quran. The foreign sciences, on the other
hand, were those analytical body of knowledge that were at odds with the Quranic traditions
and the theological propositions:
It was even essential to Islam, ..., because the 'method was part and parcel of the
Islamic orthodox process for determining orthodoxy. Where it failed was in the creation
of a set of objective standards of law, against which all other laws and principles could
be judged. Since the legal principles of Islamic law had been given once and for all, in
the Quran and the sunna, and in the principles of fiqh worked out by al-Shafi'i, the only
task left was to use logic in the narrow sense, to uncover faulty reasoning and thus
preserve the doctrinal status quo .... (27)
In this cultural tradition innovation could not prosper, yet in the tenth century Baghdad was
the centre of a great Islamic civilisation – yet one that was based on ancient principles of
science and knowledge.
Rosenberg (28) and Birdzell (29) argue that standard growth models can only provide the
proximate causes of growth. Innovation and accumulation of capital, labour and natural
resources is growth, but it does not explain growth. For them, the fundamental causes of
growth lie in favourable institutions and freedom from political restrictions – more
specifically, secure property rights and the freedom to engage in (almost) any line of business
and to acquire and sell goods at an unregulated price. This meant that the process of
innovation was delegated to private firms and that individuals themselves were forced to bear
full responsibility for their failures and reap the full benefits of their successes; a laissez-faire
model.
25 Toby Huff, The rise of early modern science:
Islam, China, and the West (2nd edn., Cambridge, 2003).
26 Madrasah (Arabic ةسردم ) is the Arabic word for school. It is variously transliterated
as madrasah, madrash, medresa, madreseh, madrassa, or madressa. It refers especially
to a Islamic religious school. The word also exists in many Arabic-influenced languages
such as Urdu, Hindi, Farsi, Turkish, Kurdish, Indonesian, Malaysian and Bosnian. The Hebrew
word midrasha also means a place of learning.
27 Toby Huff, The rise of early modern science: Islam, China, and the West
(2nd edn., Cambridge, 2003), p. 158.
28 Nathan Rosenberg, Exploring the black box: technology, economics, and history
(Cambridge, 1994); Nathan Rosenberg and Walter G. Vincenti, The Britannia Bridge:
the generation and diffusion of technological knowledge (Cambridge, 1978).
29 Nathan Rosenberg and E.E. Birdzell, How the West grew rich: the economic transformation
of the industrial world (London, 1986).
11
According to Rosenberg and Birdzell these favourable institutions and political and
economic freedoms arose in the West because of political fragmentation and competition
between different territories in Europe. Investments and the merchant class were drawn to
areas where property rights were respected and where they could carry out their business
without too much political interference. There was no single empire in Europe, and therefore
merchants could move from state to state as circumstances changed. The growth of markets –
especially that of cities and long-distance trade – further spurred this development.
Dudley right observes that favourable geographic conditions are a necessary prerequisite
for economic progress; but that this is not alone sufficient explanation (30). China had the
highest rate of innovation over two millennia before the modern era (31), yet its economic
progress – at least until very recently – was markedly inferior to that in the West. Both
geography and institutions are important (32).
Dudley’s approach was to look at
communications, using Innis’ (33) model, as modified by Kuznats (34). The latter asked why over
certain periods have income levels risen more rapidly in some societies than in others (35).
Other approaches exist also, such as Cosandey’s "rich states system theory" (36). In his view,
internalist explanations of this sort all suffer from two serious inherent defects. First, Eastern
Europe remains backward, despite ostensibly sharing the same environmental advantages
supposedly enjoyed by the West. Second, because leadership fluctuations occurred among
civilisations, such as in China, India, the Middle East, while at the height of their wealth.
Inherent superiority cannot be a sufficient explanation (37). Cosandey favours a mixed model,
with environment being also an important factor.
[Comment: I do actually favor a two tier
model, with at the first level, political and economical factors, and at the second, deeper, level,
geographical factors.]
Lang studied sociological and ecological aspects of Asian societies, religions and science.
He identified stable political divisions to be a factor in scientific progress – China was more
productive when it was divided politically. He also saw that the different coastline profiles of
Europe and China was a major element in the development of different political models in the
two regions (38).
Sardar saw the present backwardness of non-European countries as due mainly to their past
colonisation by Europeans (39). Non-Western cultures are not, per se, obstacles to science, but
science needs money to advance. The comparative retardation of science in the Third World is
due – according to Sardar – to the lack of financial means, which he ascribed to the
intervention of the West. While he would appear to be correct in some aspects of his views
(such as the need for money to advance science), it must be questioned whether the West was
responsible for the weakness of non-European science. The great age of Chinese innovation
ended in around 1300, in the Arab world in about 1050, and in India as early as 700 AD.
Some of this could be ascribed to the invasions of foes, but internal divisions seem to have
played a larger role.
30 Leonard Dudley, ‘Explaining the great divergence: Medium and message on the Eurasian
land mass 1700-1850’, in Alain Marciano and Jean-Michel Josselin (ed.), Law and the State:
A Political Economy approach (Cheltenham, 2005), p.101.
31 Joel Mokyr, The Lever of Riches: Technological creativity and economic progress
(Oxford, 1990), pp. 209-18.
32 Leonard Dudley, ‘Explaining the great divergence: Medium and message on the Eurasian
land mass 1700-1850’, in Alain Marciano and Jean-Michel Josselin (ed.),
Law and the State: A Political Economy approach (Cheltenham, 2005), p.
101.
33 Harold A. Innis, Empire and Communication (Oxford, 1950);
The Bias of Communication (Toronto, 1951).
34 Simon Kuznats, Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure and Spread (New Haven, 1966).
35 See also Angus Maddison, The World Economy: a millennial perspective (Paris, xx).
36 David Cosandey, Le Secret de l’Occident (Paris, 1997).
37 David Cosandey, Le Secret de l’Occident (Paris, 1997).
38 Graeme Lang, ‘Structural factors in the origins of modern science:
a comparison of China and Europe’ in Steven Tötösy de Zepetnek and Jennifer Jay,
East Asian Cultural and Historical Perspectives (Edmonton, 1997), pp. 71-96.
39 Ziauddin Sardar, Science, Technology and Development in the Muslim World (London, 1977).
12
Nor is it certain that financial means was lacking in all of Africa in the post-colonial era;
yet the majority of states on that continent have suffered repeated economic, political and
social crises, and many are in a markedly worse situation relatively than they were at the
granting of independence. The explanation may owe more to the constitutional arrangements
of these states than to their innate resources.
In a similar manner to that just suggested – namely that progress and retardation was
influenced more by a state of mind – or institutional arrangements – than by natural resources,
Weber contended that religion was a prime catalyst for growth in Europe. In this theory a
stern doctrine of Lutheranism and Calvinism promoted capital accumulation and economic
development as a relentless commitment to one’s earthly calling and in avoidance of trivial
pleasures (40). He derived the idea of religious inspiration for capitalism from the seventeenth
century English economist Sir William Petty (41), the founder of the modern science of
demography, and considered by Marx to be the founder of classical political economy.
Weber argued that behavioural change alone could not bring about modern capitalism as it
required an ‘appropriate set of conditions’ in the economic sphere. It was also driven by an
underlying cultural (specifically religious) ethos. However, it may be questioned whether
people are motivated by abstract ideas as much as Weber argued (Petty had relied on abstract
ideas rather less, and cited many examples to prove that religious heterodoxy and trade go
together). Perhaps more seriously, it was in the Reformed England (though also perhaps the
Calvinist Scotland) rather than the Calvinist parts of Europe that the scientific revolution
primarily originated, though there were instances of it appearing elsewhere.
The role of
religion cannot be ignored however, and there may be some truth in the comment by Kojève,
that ‘Europe owed its success to Christianity’ (42). The implications of the advent of a postreligious
Europe on its economic standing – if any – remains to be seen.
It is important to observe that the advance of science and technology requires a thriving
economy and a stable political division; not necessarily a concentration of power – indeed this
would probably not promote innovation – but rather a dynamic tension between and among
stable competitor states. If one is too dominant there could be a serious imbalance, which
could result in instability in the weaker states, and eventually to the decline of the stronger
state, as its markets, and sources of raw materials, become weaker. Balance – and the resultant
tension of comparatively equal players – is crucial.
Baechler, developing a nascent state systems theory, concluded that Western Europe
enjoyed a stable state system which was instrumental in the economic development of the
region (what he called the ‘growth of capitalism’) (43). For him the existence of political stability
was a necessary pre-condition for growth, and this pre-condition could only be brought about
by the existence of stable states.
Taking a step back, to look at some of the possible reasons why stable states promoted
growth, Blamont argued that government support for science and technology was motivated
by prestige and power. Science was pursued as well, if not mostly, to satisfy the princely will
for power and domination (44). This domination might be internal, or it might be external – but it
required a competitor to the prince, so the latter provided the most stable circumstances for
innovation.
Braudel classified many decisive economic and political factors. He identified in particular
the crucial role of sea-borne trade in the development of economic power. But he also
emphasised the importance of multipolarity and the ultimately harmful effect of a unique
40 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism trans. Talcott Parsons (London, 1992).
41 Sir William Petty, The Collected Works of William Petty ed. T.W. Hutchison (London, 1997).
42 Alexandre Kojève, Александр Владимирович Кожевников, Aleksandr Vladimirovič Koževnikov. See Shadia B
Drury, Alexandre Kojève: The Roots of Postmodern Politics {Basingstoke, 1994).
43 Jean Baechler, Les Origines du Capitalisme (Paris, 1971).
44 Jacques Blamont, Le Chiffre et Le Songe: Histoire politique de la découverte (Paris, 1993).
13
(without significant internal dynamic tensions) empire for China and the Muslim world.
Braudel also recognised the importance of the causal relation between economic prosperity
and the progress of science and technology (45).
Jones, though advancing an environmental argument, considered many possible views, but
was essentially an externalist. He also emphasised the gradual taming of governments as
pivotal in the development of economies (46). He sought for mechanistic – social, political,
economic – reasons for the rise of the West, and ultimately emphasised the state system as the
decisive factor in the ascendance of Western Europe and Japan (47).
Many of these theorists were concerned with the particular problem of China. That country
was for long centuries very innovative, and it enjoyed considerable natural resources. Why
then did it fail to grow at a rate comparable with that of Europe in the eighteenth to the
twentieth centuries? There must, logically, be some explanation, however difficult it might be
to identify. While China differed in many respects from Europe, this did not mean that it
should not be equally successful economically. One aspect in which it differed, and which
may have had an effect, was in its constitutional ethos or paradigm. Intellectual and economic
freedom was not merely tolerated in Europe, but encouraged (at least after the Reformation,
and in many fields well before this). This process began to have an obvious effect in the
United Kingdom, the first of the liberal democracies, though it can be traced back many
centuries. While it would be precipitant to suggest that democracy is the explanation, it may
be worthwhile to set this aside for consideration.
Diamond suggested that the mountain chains and marshes of Europe formed barriers which
prevented a single dominant state from evolving. But would these physical barriers actually
foster – or hinder – economic growth? The Roman empire extended across large tracts of
Europe and North Africa despite these boundaries, and it was, for some centuries,
economically and politically successful by any fair measure. Success may indeed have been
due to factors independent of the physical environment, features that allowed success despite
the hurdles the empire faced.
Mokyr concentrated his attention very largely on Western Europe and China, neglecting
almost entirely the Middle East, India and other East Asian countries (48). Further, he tended to
over-simplify the degree of unity displayed in China, and as a consequence did not fully
recognise that the degree of progressiveness of the Chinese governments is directly linked to
the macro-political situation.
It has been observed that progressiveness is evident when China is stably divided, and nonexistent
or even negative when it is united (49).
It might however be observed that the current
cycle of Chinese industrialisation and economic growth may contradict this hypothesis, but it
can be countered that the primary catalysts for this expansion has been the existence of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and to the fact that in mainland China, though
provinces are theoretically subservient to the central government of the People’s Republic of
China, in practice provincial officials have a large amount of discretion with regard to
economic policy.
[Comment: not exactly; China stagnated
when it was unified and deprived of same-level competitor states. Over most of history,
this happened everytime when China got unified, since it was as a good approximation to consider
each of the main civilizations (Europe, India, China) as isolated, militarily speaking.
Since the XIXth century, this is no longer the case. China got blessed with new strong and threatening
competitors: Britain (1839-42 and 1850-64 opium wars), Russia (1850-64 war), Japan (1894-95 war),
France and Germany (1898 and 1900 wars).
From this time on, China could be united and advance scientifically, because it had
become a member of a larger states system. Indeed, it made huge progresses and caught up with
the West. Nowadays, thanks to a strong competition with the US and India, China,
even unified, is not going to stagnate.]
It is the constitutional tension offered by the division of the country into relatively stable,
but competing, units, that led to progress. It might almost be said that Orson Welles’s
memorable line from the film The Third Man, was prescient in anticipating later theorists: ‘In
Italy for thirty years under the Borgias they had warfare, terror, murder, bloodshed — they
produced Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, and the Renaissance. In Switzerland they had
45 Fernand Braudel, Civilisation and Capitalism, 15th-18th century (London, 1985).
46 Eric L. Jones, The European Miracle: Environments, Economies, and Geopolitics
in the History of Europe and Asia (2nd ed., Cambridge, 1987).
47 Eric L. Jones, The Record of Global Economic Development (Cheltenham, 2002)
48 Joel Mokyr, The Lever of Riches: Technological creativity and economic progress (Oxford, 1990).
49 David Cosandey, Le Secret de l’Occident (Paris, 1997), pp. 209-64.
14
brotherly love, five hundred years of democracy and peace, and what did they produce? The
cuckoo clock (50).
[Comment: what a poor quote: Welles was
no historian... During all its history, Switzerland was actually torn by terrible
internal wars and weathered terrible external wars. And it produced much more than
the cuckoo clock!]
Dynamic tension has its advantages, as the role played by biodiversity in
evolutionary biology illustrates (51).
Pomeranz argued that stocks of coal, and access to the resources of the Americas, aided
European economic growth. But China has much coal, and the gold from South and Central
America helped to ruin the economy of Spain, and condemn it to centuries of relative
economic and political oblivion. Europe itself was to undergo a long Dark Age, from c.300
AD to 1100 AD, that was caused by a variety of forces, not least of which was the mass
migration of peoples from the east (52).
Baechler, Blamont, Cosandey, Diamond, Needham and others offer us a variety of
political and economic theories. Whilst they have some similarities there are also aspects in
which they are divergent. The institutional theories from Huff, and Rosenberg and Birdzell,
also reflect these difficulties. But from our perspective the greatest problem is that they are
attempting to describe the success and failure of whole states and multi-state regions. Such as
exercise inevitably present complexities of interpretation that threaten to reduce them to idle
speculation. We will therefore attempt to narrow the focus, firstly by looking at the structural
influences upon the success of individual states that may be ascribed to statehood itself.
1.3 The success of individual states
Failure in states is a notion that presents an immediate difficulty. Legal formalism may be in
decline in respect of domestic law, but has apparently strengthened its hold on international
law (53). A failed state is still a state in international law, though sociologically or economically
it may not be one. It is distinct from a state because it is a political entity, which a civilisation
need not necessarily be (though it very often is, and the state and the civilisation may be one
and the same). The existence of the legal structure or entity called the state, distinct from the
community that comprises it, is an important element, for the state itself, as an entity, has its
own inherent dynamism or tenacity.
This dichotomy – the tension between the state entity and the country or civilisation of
which it is a part – allows the survival of many states whose viability is marginal, at best, and
may actually contribute to the decline
15
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